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From Facebook to Mug Shot: How 
the Dearth of Social Networking 
Privacy Rights Revolutionized 
Online Government Surveillance 
 
Junichi P. Semitsu* 
 
Abstract 
 
Each month, Facebook‘s half billion active users 
disseminate over 30 billion pieces of content. In this complex 
digital ecosystem, they live a parallel life that, for many, 
involves more frequent, fulfilling, and compelling 
communication than any other offline or online forum. But 
even though Facebook users have privacy options to control 
who sees what content, this Article concludes that every single 
one of Facebook‘s 133 million active users in the United States 
lack a reasonable expectation of privacy from government 
surveillance of virtually all of their online activity. 
Based on Facebook‘s own interpretations of federal privacy 
laws, a warrant is only necessary to compel disclosure of inbox 
and outbox messages less than 181 days old. Everything else 
can be obtained with subpoenas that do not even require 
reasonable suspicion. Accordingly, over the last six years, 
government agents have ―worked the beat‖ by mining the 
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treasure trove of personal and confidential information on 
Facebook. 
But while Facebook has been justifiably criticized for its 
weak and shifting privacy rules, this Article demonstrates that 
even if it adopted the strongest and clearest policies possible, 
its users would still lack reasonable expectations of privacy 
under federal law. First, federal courts have failed to properly 
adapt Fourth Amendment law to the realities of Internet 
architecture. Since all Facebook content has been knowingly 
exposed to at least one third party, the Supreme Court‘s 
current Fourth Amendment jurisprudence does not clearly stop 
investigators from being allowed carte blanche to fish through 
the entire site for incriminating evidence. Second, Congress has 
failed to meaningfully revise the Electronic Communications 
Privacy Act (ECPA) for over a quarter century. Even if the 
ECPA were amended to cover all Facebook content, its lack of a 
suppression remedy would be one of several things that would 
keep Facebook a permanent open book. Thus, even when the 
government lacks reasonable suspicion of criminal activity and 
the user opts for the strictest privacy controls, Facebook users 
still cannot expect federal law to stop their ―private‖ content 
and communications from being used against them. 
This Article seeks to bring attention to this problem and 
rectify it. It examines Facebook‘s architecture, reveals the ways 
in which government agencies have investigated crimes on 
social networking sites, and analyzes how courts have 
interpreted the Fourth Amendment and the ECPA. The Article 
concludes with an urgent proposal to revise the ECPA and 
reinterpret Katz before the Facebook generation accepts the 
Hobson‘s choice it currently faces: either live life off the grid or 
accept that using modern communications technologies means 
the possibility of unwarranted government surveillance. 
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I. Introduction 
 
“I want everybody here to be careful about what you post on 
Facebook, because in the YouTube age, whatever you do, it will 
be pulled up again later somewhere in your life.” 
- President Barack Obama1 
 
Facebook is not just a website. It is a controlled ecosystem 
that inspires its inhabitants to share personal information and 
reveal intimate thoughts. It is an evolving digital world that 
eliminates the limitations of distance, time, technology, and 
body odor in ―real space‖ to create connections and 
communities unimaginable in the twentieth century. 
Facebook also happens to be the most popular destination 
on the Internet2 today.3 Russian investor Yuri Milner, who 
owns ten percent of the company, commented that it is ―the 
largest Web site there has ever been, so large that it is not a 
Web site at all.‖4 Fulfilling CEO Mark Zuckerberg‘s goal to 
―dominate‖5 online communication, the site, as of September 
2010, comprises over 500 million active users,6 half who log on 
 
1. Obama Warns U.S. Teens of Perils of Facebook, REUTERS, Sept. 8, 
2009, available at http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSN0828582220090908. 
2. In this Article, I am attempting to consciously use the word ―Internet‖ 
and avoid the ―World Wide Web‖ or ―the web.‖ This is due in part to the fact 
that Facebook is part of the growing trend to move from the World Wide Web 
to ―semiclosed platforms that use the Internet for transport but not the 
browser for display.‖ See Chris Anderson & Michael Wolff, The Web is Dead. 
Long Live the Internet, WIRED MAGAZINE (Aug. 17, 2010), 
http://www.wired.com/magazine/2010/08/ff_webrip/all/1. Today, browser 
content constitutes less than 25 percent of the Internet traffic and is only 
shrinking further. Id. 
3. See Michael Arrington, Hitwise says Facebook Most Popular U.S. Site, 
TECHCRUNCH (Mar. 15, 2010), http://techcrunch.com/2010/03/15/hitwise-says-
facebook-most-popular-u-s-site/. 
4. See Anderson & Wolff, supra note 2. 
5. Jose Antonio Vargas, The Face of Facebook, NEW YORKER (Sept. 20, 
2010), 
http://www.newyorker.com/reporting/2010/09/20/100920fa_fact_vargas?curre
ntPage=all. 
6. If it were a country, Facebook would be the third most populous 
nation in the world, with a birth rate that would allow it to surpass China 
and India in just a few years. According to the United Nations, China‘s 
population was 1.346 billion and India‘s was 1.198 billion in 2009. See U.N. 
3
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daily. 7 
Collectively, this community disseminates more than 30 
billion pieces of content per month to audiences chosen by their 
creators.8 Its dominance in social media stems from the fact 
that it has moved beyond its origins as a peephole to pry into 
others‘ lives. Today, Facebook has transformed into a simple, 
one-stop, all-purpose, habit-forming site for everyone from the 
underage to the golden-aged, neophytes to techies, gamers to 
political activists, and even pets to corporations. 
When its membership expanded, so did its appeal and its 
potential to effect change and create connections. Facebook has 
sparked many marriages between strangers,9 named babies,10 
served as an alibi for the wrongly accused,11 united long-lost 
relatives,12 sparked political revolutions,13 and even launched a 
 
Secretariat, Population Div. of the Dep‘t of Econ. & Soc. Affairs, World 
Population Prospects: The 2008 Revision, Highlights (2009), 
http://www.un.org/esa/population/publications/wpp2008/wpp2008_text_tables
.pdf. As for the growth rate, in the United States alone, the number of 
Facebook users in the United States jumped from 42,089,200 on January 4, 
2009 to 103,085,520 a year later. See Peter Corbett, Facebook Demographics 
and Statistics Report 2010 – 145% Growth in 1 Year, ISTRATEGYLABS (Jan. 4, 
2010), http://www.istrategylabs.com/2010/01/facebook-demographics-and-
statistics-report-2010-145-growth-in-1-year/. This represents a growth rate of 
144.9%. Id. 
7. Press Room: Statistics, FACEBOOK, 
http://www.facebook.com/press/info.php?statistics (last visited Oct. 31, 2010). 
8. Id. 
9. For example, Facebook launched the marriage of two Kelly 
Hildebrandts when twenty-year-old Kelly Katrina Hildebrandt of Florida 
typed her name into Facebook to see if anybody shared it and met twenty-
four-year-old Kelly Carl Hildebrandt of Texas. See Sam Jones, Facebook 
Couple with Same Name to Marry, GUARDIAN.CO.UK.COM (July 21, 2009, 14:10 
BST), http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2009/jul/21/same-name-couple-
facebook-marry. 
10. Unfortunately, as of this publication, only 94,530 had joined the 
group ―Laura will name her baby Megatron if 100,000 people join this group!‖ 
See Laura Will Name Her Baby Megatron if 100,000 People Join this Group!, 
FACEBOOK, 
http://www.facebook.com/group.php?gid=7585598759&ref=search&sid=20905
568.1841317061..1 (last visited Jan. 6, 2011). 
11. Robbery charges against Rodney Bradford were dropped when he 
proved that, at the time of the robbery, he had changed his Facebook status 
to ―Where‘s my pancakes‖ from his home. See Damiano Beltrami, His 
Facebook Status Now? „Charges Dropped‟, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 12, 2009, at A27. 
12. An Italian man who had been kidnapped by his father when he was 
4http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol31/iss1/7
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successful campaign to get eighty-eight-year-old national 
treasure Betty White invited to host Saturday Night Live for 
the first time in her half-century career.14 
But the site‘s social benefits have also invited people to 
(over)share while lulling them into a false sense of privacy. 
People who joined Facebook during its infancy are quickly 
realizing that their online past is affecting their offline future. 
Facebook users are always one embarrassing photo away from 
their reputation being instantly ruined and ravaged before 
their entire network of family, friends, classmates, and 
colleagues. According to one study, 8 percent of companies with 
one thousand employees or more have terminated at least one 
employee for comments posted on a social networking site.15 
Moreover, Facebook has proved to be a treasure trove of 
useful information for lawyers. The American Academy of 
Matrimonial Lawyers recently stated that a whopping 81 
percent of its attorneys have used or faced evidence found on 
social networking sites like Facebook in divorce proceedings.16 
In response to the rising tide of criticism regarding its 
privacy policies, Facebook now allows users to communicate 
with varying subjective levels of privacy expectations, just as in 
the non-digital world. In fact, the site arguably provides 
communication shields that some people lack in the real world; 
in densely-populated urban environments, people in a public 
 
five years-old used Facebook to reunite with his Italian relatives after 
twenty-two years of living apart. See Egypt: 'Italian child' appears in Cairo 
after 22 years, ADNKRONOS INTERNATIONAL (Dec. 8, 2009), 
http://www.adnkronos.com/AKI/English/CultureAndMedia/?id=3.0.408335183
6. 
13. See Samantha M. Shapiro, Revolution, Facebook-Style, N.Y. TIMES 
MAG., Jan. 25, 2009, at MM34. 
14. Lisa de Moraes, Facebook Campaign for Betty White Pays Off: „SNL‟ 
Posts Election-Season Numbers, WASH. POST, May 11, 2010, at A06. As a joke, 
Ms. White stated in her opening monologue on SNL that she did not know 
what Facebook was, but after she found out, she concluded that ―it seems like 
a huge waste of time[;]‖ the audience‘s laughter reflected a universal 
understanding of the truth underlying the joke. Id. 
15. See Adam Ostrow, Facebook Fired: 8% of US Companies have Sacked 
Social Media Miscreants, MASHABLE.COM (Aug.10, 2009), 
http://mashable.com/2009/08/10/social-media-misuse (discussing survey by 
Internet security firm Proofpoint). 
16. Leanne Italic, Facebook is Divorce Lawyers' New Best Friend, 
MSNBC.COM, June 28, 2010, http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/37986320/. 
5
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space might struggle to converse without running the risk of 
being overheard. 
Unlike most other social networking sites and Internet 
fora, Facebook provides users with many controls to determine 
who can view various categories of content. The potential 
readership begins with nobody and ends with everybody. 
Recluses like author Harper Lee17 can use Facebook to 
communicate with one confidante, while exhibitionists like 
rocker Tommy Lee18 can use it to broadcast hourly status 
updates to the world. 
Yet, despite these privacy controls, every single one of 
Facebook‘s 120 million active users in the United States lack a 
reasonable expectation of privacy from unfettered government 
surveillance of their online activity. After all, in Katz v. United 
States, the Supreme Court stated that ―[w]hat a person 
knowingly exposes to the public . . . is not a subject of Fourth 
Amendment protection.‖19 This Third Party Doctrine, if applied 
literally, leaves Facebook users with no expectation of privacy 
since any content on Facebook has been knowingly exposed to 
at least one third party (the Facebook staff) and, therefore, 
could be treated as if it were shared with the world. 
Moreover, the Electronic Communications Privacy Act 
(ECPA), enacted in 1986, does not clearly apply to most of the 
communications on Facebook. Furthermore, under the statute, 
the government need not have probable cause or provide notice 
to compel disclosure of ―private‖ information. In effect, only 
state laws and the court of public opinion prevent Facebook 
from giving the government carte blanche to fish through 
everything under the Facebook.com domain for incriminating 
 
17. If Harper Lee does have a Facebook account, it is not open to the 
public. However, her fans created multiple Facebook pages devoted to her. 
See, e.g., Harper Lee, FACEBOOK, http://www.facebook.com/pages/Harper-
Lee/109379712415100?v=desc (last visited Nov. 1, 2010). 
18. Tommy Lee, drummer for Mötley Crüe, has a Facebook page, which 
can be viewed by any member of the public, even without a Facebook account. 
See Tommyleetv, FACEBOOK, http://www.facebook.com/tommyleetv (last 
visited Nov. 1, 2010). While he uses his Facebook page to announce new 
projects and tours, he also uses it to share random thoughts, including the 
following message that he posted on September 5, 2010: ―Fuck I‘m Hungry!!!‖ 
Id. 
19. 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967). 
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evidence. 
In this Article, I argue that a court does not faithfully 
apply Katz if it rules that every Facebook user lacks reasonable 
expectations of privacy with regard to personal information—
e.g., every organizational affiliation, unshared photo, private 
message, unsent party invitation, and ―poke‖—even when the 
user opts for the strictest privacy controls, limits access to a 
sole recipient, and removes content immediately after 
uploading it. The majority in Katz could not have possibly 
intended that a friendless hermit who sporadically logs on to 
write a secret online diary enjoys the same privacy rights (or 
lack thereof) as an aspiring reality television star who shares 
videos of her every bacchanalian shenanigans with the world. 
Yet, in the world of Facebook, federal law offers the same 
minimal privacy protections to both the hermit and the 
narcissist. 
This privacy void in many online communications leads to 
an absurd result: in an era when many communicate more 
online than in person, Facebook users in different towns might 
need to enter an archaic phone booth and close the door in 
order to expect privacy. 
Given the growing awareness of privacy concerns 
presented by Facebook, one might conclude that its flaws will 
force users to migrate to a better site. Indeed, the rapid rate of 
technological change and the fickle nature of the digital era 
suggest that Facebook could soon go the way of MySpace and 
become the next ―abandoned amusement park‖ of the 
Internet.20 New social networking sites surface regularly, often 
employing new technologies and serving different purposes, but 
ultimately hoping to steal Facebook‘s traffic.21 
Even though Facebook could do lots to improve its users‘ 
 
20. Jon Swartz, MySpace CEO Owen Van Natta Steps Down, USA 
TODAY, Feb. 11, 2010, http://www.usatoday.com/tech/news/2010-02-11-
myspaceceo_ST_N.htm. 
21. For example, Flickr provides users with an opportunity to share and 
comment on photos. About Flickr, FLICKR, http://www.flickr.com/about/ (last 
visited Nov. 1, 2010). Yelp allows users to leave and read reviews of nearly 
everything. About Us, YELP, http://www.yelp.com/about (last visited Nov. 1, 
2010). IJustMadeLove.com allows users to share where, when, and how they 
most recently engaged in intercourse. IJUSTMADELOVE, 
http://ijustmadelove.com/ (last visited Nov. 1, 2010). 
7
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consumer privacy rights, the issues of privacy from government 
surveillance originate with the government, not Facebook. 
Regardless of what social networking will look like in 2024 or 
whether our clones will have new ways to tap into new 
networks, one fact seems inevitable: in the digital world, social 
networkers will still store, access, and disseminate personal 
information through a third party. A digital community on the 
magnitude of Facebook will likely depend on some entity that 
functions as the server or hub for the content. While peer-to-
peer networks suggest the possibility of direct communications 
without third party conduits, the very nature of the Internet 
makes it difficult to imagine a social network emerging in 
isolation without a person or entity hosting or facilitating the 
exchange. The resulting unreasonable expectation of privacy 
will thus follow those social networkers wherever they go 
unless there is congressional intervention or a judicial shift in 
how the Fourth Amendment is applied to online 
communications. 
While this unique architectural feature has engendered 
the Facebook Effect, it also explains what I call the Facebook 
Defect: the failure of both the government and social 
networking sites to ensure that certain online communications 
receive the same probable cause standard set forth in the 
Fourth Amendment as they would offline. While the Facebook 
Effect has revolutionized the ways in which people 
communicate, the Facebook Defect has equally transformed the 
ability of governments around the globe to pry into the private 
lives of its citizens. 
While modern wiretapping and other electronic recording 
devices might be more reminiscent of the law enforcement 
techniques depicted in Nineteen Eighty-Four, the government‘s 
ability to tap into social networking sites comes far closer to 
matching George Orwell‘s ―Thought Police‖: 
 
There was of course no way of knowing whether 
you were being watched at any given moment. 
How often, or on what system, the Thought 
Police plugged in on any individual wire was 
guesswork. It was even conceivable that they 
watched everybody all the time. But at any rate 
8http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol31/iss1/7
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they could plug in your wire whenever they 
wanted to. 22 
 
What Orwell did not foresee, however, is that an 
omniscient ―Big Brother‖ would result through government 
inactivity, as opposed to a totalitarian takeover. Indeed, 
criminal investigators now have access to an unsurpassed 
amount of private information thanks to the voluntary efforts 
of private citizens and the government‘s failure to ensure that 
privacy laws keep pace with changing technology. 
Nonetheless, Facebook demonstrates Orwell‘s 
prognostications that one day the government would be able to 
tap into the thoughts and activities of its citizens. If that is not 
convincing enough, perhaps Orwell‘s prescience is best 
illustrated by this fact: Mark Zuckerberg, the CEO and co-
founder of Facebook, was born in 1984.23 
This Article seeks to analyze how the Fourth Amendment 
and federal statutes apply—and should apply—to evidence 
obtained on Facebook. 
In the first Part, I will demonstrates how Facebook‘s 
architecture and policy changes provide enough nuanced and 
customized privacy controls to allow users to signal their 
intention to keep some data private. 
In Part II, I will reveal the ways in which government 
agencies have investigated crimes by gathering evidence on 
Facebook. 
In Part III, I will analyze how courts have interpreted the 
Fourth Amendment and the ECPA. Part IV will then apply 
these rules to Facebook and demonstrate how existing rules 
fail to protect information that most Facebook users assume is 
shielded from warrantless law enforcement searches. 
Finally, in Part V, I make several proposals that faithfully 
apply Katz to Facebook and balance users‘ privacy concerns 
with the government‘s desire to collect evidence in criminal 
investigations. Specifically, I will offer a normative framework 
for applying the Fourth Amendment and the Third Party 
 
22. GEORGE ORWELL, NINETEEN EIGHTY-FOUR 3-4 (1949). 
23. Mark Zuckerberg, FACEBOOK, http://www.facebook.com/zuck (last 
visited Nov. 1, 2010). 
9
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Doctrine to social networking sites‘ (SNS) content and propose 
a statutory revision to the ECPA. 
 
II. The Code of Facebook 
 
“I‟m trying to make the world a more open place.” 
 
- Facebook CEO and Co-Founder Mark Zuckerberg24 
 
A. Facebook‟s Architecture 
 
Facebook began as a closed social network that required 
registration with a university e-mail address from an Ivy 
League school. Slowly, Facebook was opened to all schools. Its 
initial exclusivity undoubtedly contributes to its publicity and 
popularity. By 2006, when the site was opened to the general 
public, ―its clublike, ritualistic, highly regulated foundation 
was already in place.‖25 
Today, Facebook asks its users to disclose a vast array of 
personal information, which explains why the site is such a 
treasure trove of evidence for government investigators. When 
joining, users are invited to post their: 
 
- favorite music 
- favorite books 
- favorite movies 
- favorite quotes 
- address 
- hometown 
- phone numbers 
- e-mail addresses 
- clubs 
- job 
- job history 
- educational history 
 
24. Id. 
25. Anderson & Wolff, supra note 2. 
10http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol31/iss1/7
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- birth dates 
- sexual orientation 
- interests 
- daily schedules 
- relation to friends 
- pictures 
- political affiliations 
 
In addition to what users choose to divulge, Facebook ―will 
receive information from [other third parties], including 
information about actions you take . . . even before you connect 
with the application or website.‖26 Moreover, the site collects 
information about a user when ―tagged‖ in a photo uploaded by 
another user. All of this information is ―gathered regardless of 
your use of the web site.‖27 Not only does Facebook collect this 
information, but it also disseminates this data to about five 
hundred thousand third-party application developers.28 
But Facebook is far more than a corner of cyberspace 
where people poke friends and discuss common interests. More 
than 70 percent of Facebook users frequently visit the site to 
engage with other platforms—ranging from news-aggregating 
services to virtual livestock-raising games—some of which are 
only available through Facebook (and subservient to its 
platform).29 Moreover, over a million websites and third-party 
applications allow users to interact through Facebook, even 
without actually visiting the Facebook site. Which is to say, if 
Facebook is a business parked on a specific corner of 
cyberspace, many active customers never visit, while its actual 
visitors are more likely looking for a million other businesses.30 
 
26. Facebook Privacy Policy, FACEBOOK, 
http://www.facebook.com/policy.php (last visited Jan. 31, 2011). 
27. Id. 
28. Sarah Perez, How to Delete Facebook Applications (and Why You 
Should), READWRITEWEB.COM, 
http://www.readwriteweb.com/archives/how_to_delete_facebook_applications_
and_why_you_should.php (last visited Nov. 1, 2010). 
29. Id. 
30. This horrible sentence symbolizes the difficulty with analogizing 
cyberspace to real space. Please do not attempt this at home without adult 
supervision. 
11
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Today, Facebook‘s infrastructure hardly resembles the 
cyber-technology of only a decade earlier, when ―using‖ an 
Internet-based service largely meant visiting a specific URL 
address on the World Wide Web. Today, users can 
communicate ―through‖ Facebook without even visiting the 
Facebook.com domain. For starters, more than 150 million 
users access Facebook through a Facebook application on their 
mobile devices.31 
Moreover, Facebook users increasingly use the site to 
access third-party platforms created by over a million 
developers from 180 different countries. These platforms have 
also been integrated into over a million websites outside of the 
Facebook.com domain.32 Thus, Facebook allows a fan of the 
board game Scrabble, for example, to find a complete stranger 
to play against without actually visiting Facebook.33 
 
B. Facebook‟s Prior Privacy Policy 
 
Over its short existence, Facebook has repeatedly changed 
its privacy policies. Sometimes, the changes have been to the 
dismay of those concerned about privacy. At other times, the 
changes were in response to uproars about privacy. 
But generally speaking, Facebook‘s policies have largely 
shifted from the default assumption of privacy to a default 
assumption of openness. Moreover, the policies have shifted 
from complete control over all information to partial control.34 
For example, in 2005, Facebook‘s privacy policy stated: 
 
―No personal information that you submit to 
Thefacebook will be available to any user of the 
Web Site who does not belong to at least one of 
the groups specified by you in your privacy 
 
31. Press Room: Statistics, supra note 7. 
32. Id. 
33. See Scrabble on Facebook, HASBRO.COM, 
http://www.hasbro.com/shop/details.cfm?guid=94365F4B-6D40-1014-8BF0-
9EFBF894F9D4&product_id=23064&src=endeca (last visited Oct. 30, 2010). 
34. Kurt Opsahl, Facebook's Eroding Privacy Policy: A Timeline, EFF 
DEEPLINKS BLOG (Apr. 28, 2010), 
http://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2010/04/facebook-timeline. 
12http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol31/iss1/7
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settings.‖35 
 
Two years later, however, the above language was removed and 
replaced with: 
 
Profile information you submit to Facebook will 
be available to users of Facebook who belong to 
at least one of the networks you allow to access 
the information through your privacy settings 
(e.g., school, geography, friends of friends). Your 
name, school name, and profile picture 
thumbnail will be available in search results 
across the Facebook network unless you alter 
your privacy settings.36 
 
By November 2009, many more categories of information were 
included in the list of content that was available to everyone by 
default.37 
While the reasons behind these changes were never fully 
explained, most observers recognize that the changes were a 
necessary first step toward achieving Facebook‘s long-term 
goal: 
 
Eventually, the company hopes that users will 
read articles, visit restaurants, and watch movies 
based on what their Facebook friends have 
recommended, not, say, based on a page that 
Google‘s algorithm sends them to. Zuckerberg 
imagines Facebook as, eventually, a layer 
underneath almost every electronic device. You‘ll 
turn on your TV, and you‘ll see that fourteen of 
your Facebook friends are watching ―Entourage,‖ 
 
35. Id. Note that Facebook was originally known as ―Thefacebook‖ or 
thefacebook.com when introduced at Harvard University. Michael M. 
Grynbaum, Mark E. Zuckerberg ‟06: The Whiz behind thefacebook.com, THE 
HARVARD CRIMSON, June 10, 2004, 
http://www.thecrimson.com/article/2004/6/10/mark-e-zuckerberg-06-the-
whiz/. 
36. Id. 
37. Id. 
13
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and that your parents taped ―60 Minutes‖ for 
you. You‘ll buy a brand-new phone, and you‘ll 
just enter your credentials. All your friends—and 
perhaps directions to all the places you and they 
have visited recently—will be right there.38 
 
This vision of a customized recommendation system, 
dictated by trusted friends, requires that Facebook users be 
willing to disclose this information, of course. Given the low 
likelihood of users affirmatively going to their account settings 
and changing privacy policies, the alternative of requiring 
Facebook users to ―opt in‖ to information-sharing would have 
jeopardized the company‘s long-term goal of global domination. 
In addition to forcing users to affirmatively opt out of 
sharing information with others, Facebook has also made that 
process increasingly complex and unwieldy. In reviewing 
Facebook‘s current policy (discussed in the next section), the 
New York Times observed that ―[t]o opt out of full disclosure of 
most information, it is necessary to click through more than 50 
privacy buttons, which then require choosing among a total of 
more than 170 options.‖39 Publications like the Washington 
Post have devoted entire pages to simply attempting to help 
Facebook users set privacy options.40 Indeed, after Facebook 
announced its Places feature, it hilariously announced, ―We‘ve 
created a [four-minute long] video that explains our simple and 
powerful privacy settings.‖41  
 
 
 
38. Vargas, supra note 5. 
39. Nick Bilton, Price of Facebook Privacy? Start Clicking, N.Y. TIMES, 
May 12, 2010, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/05/13/technology/personaltech/13basics.html?_r
=1. 
40. Help File: Facebook 'Places' Privacy Settings, WASH. POST, Aug. 22, 
2010, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2010/08/20/AR2010082006416.html. 
41. FACEBOOK BLOG, 
http://blog.facebook.com/blog.php?post=418175202130 (last visited Oct. 31, 
2010). Keep in mind that this video is not about how to use the Places 
feature; it is merely an instructional video on the privacy options for the 
feature. 
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C. Facebook‟s Current Privacy Policy 
 
Facebook‘s current policy, which became effective in 
December 2010, is now 5,954 words long.42 Facebook‘s ―Help 
Center‖ is available to assist users, but the word count for the 
privacy-related FAQ adds up to more than 45,000 words, which 
is almost twice as long as this Article, including the footnotes.43 
While many aspects of Facebook‘s privacy policy form and 
affect users‘ expectations of privacy, the most relevant parts 
are discussed below: 
 
 1. ―How We Share Information‖ 
 
Section 6 of Facebook‘s current privacy policy, which was 
last revised on October 5, 2010, is titled ―How We Share 
Information.‖ The section begins with the following broad 
pronouncement: 
 
Facebook is about sharing information with 
others — friends and people in your communities 
— while providing you with privacy settings that 
you can use to restrict other users from accessing 
some of your information. We share your 
information with third parties when we believe 
the sharing is permitted by you, reasonably 
necessary to offer our services, or when legally 
required to do so.44 
 
Users who read this preamble may justifiably conclude 
that, so long as they restrict access to specific individuals 
whom they trust, Facebook will not disclose any content to the 
government unless ―legally required‖ to do so. 
However, Facebook then lists the situations when it might 
share your information to other parties. Most pertinent to this 
 
42. The New York Times noted that the previous policy was longer than 
the United States Constitution, which is 4,543 words without any of its 
amendments. Bilton, supra note 39. 
43. Id. 
44. Facebook Privacy Policy, supra note 26, § 6. 
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Article, the policy provides that: 
 
We may disclose information pursuant to 
subpoenas, court orders, or other requests 
(including criminal and civil matters) if we have 
a good faith belief that the response is required 
by law.45 
 
Thus, Facebook specifically announces that it ―may‖ 
respond to mere government ―requests,‖ suggesting a standard 
far lower than reasonable suspicion or probable cause. The 
―required by law‖ part of the first sentence might be 
interpreted to mean that it will deny any ―requests‖ unless it 
will face obstruction or contempt charges. However, as 
discussed in Part III and IV, what is ―required by law‖ is a 
fuzzy standard. 
The next sentence then states that it may also respond to 
requests for content outside of the United States: 
 
This may include respecting requests from 
jurisdictions outside of the United States where 
we have a good faith belief that the response is 
required by law under the local laws in that 
jurisdiction, apply to users from that jurisdiction, 
and are consistent with generally accepted 
international standards. 46 
 
This passage suggests that it will not be used to disclose the 
content of American users to other countries unless those users 
are ―from‖ that jurisdiction. Thus, if a California citizen denies 
the Holocaust in her Facebook status and thereby violates the 
laws of Belgium, which explicitly criminalize Holocaust 
denials,47 this policy suggests that Facebook would refuse to 
hand over any content. 
 
45. Id. 
46. Id. 
47. Verfassungsgesetz vom 8. Mai 1945 über das Verbot der NSDAP 
(Verbotsgesetz 1947) in der Fassung der Verbotsgesetznovelle 1992, available 
at http://www.nachkriegsjustiz.at/service/gesetze/gs_vg_3_1992.php. 
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However, the final part of this paragraph from Facebook‘s 
privacy policy provides a broad catch-all disclaimer that 
seemingly dismantles the restrictions implied in the above 
passages: 
 
We may also share information when we have a 
good faith belief it is necessary to prevent fraud 
or other illegal activity, to prevent imminent 
bodily harm, or to protect ourselves and you from 
people violating our Statement of Rights and 
Responsibilities. This may include sharing 
information with other companies, lawyers, 
courts or other government entities.48 
 
Thus, under Facebook‘s policies, users are on notice that any 
evidence of ―fraud,‖ ―illegal activity,‖ or ―imminent bodily 
harm‖ may be shared with any government entity, as well as 
―companies‖ and ―lawyers.‖ 
 
 2. ―How You Can Change or Remove Information‖ 
 
Another relevant part of Facebook‘s privacy policy is 
Section 7, which delineates what information Facebook 
archives and for how long. The policy states that ―deactivating‖ 
an account will not result in the removal of any content, while 
―deleting‖ an account may result in permanent deletion: 
 
Deactivating or deleting your account. If 
you want to stop using your account you may 
deactivate it or delete it. When you deactivate an 
account, no user will be able to see it, but it will 
not be deleted. We save your profile information 
(connections, photos, etc.) in case you later decide 
to reactivate your account. Many users 
deactivate their accounts for temporary reasons 
and in doing so are asking us to maintain their 
information until they return to Facebook. You 
 
48. Facebook Privacy Policy, supra note 26, § 6. 
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will still have the ability to reactivate your 
account and restore your profile in its entirety. 
When you delete an account, it is permanently 
deleted from Facebook. You should only delete 
your account if you are certain you never want to 
reactivate it.49 
 
This policy suggests that a Facebook user can confidently 
assume that his or her information is completely wiped out, 
thereby ensuring that no subpoena or warrant would allow 
such content to resurface. Later in this section, the policy 
makes clear ―[r]emoved and deleted information may persist in 
backup copies for up to 90 days, but will not be available to 
others.‖50 
Based on the above, a Facebook user might believe that 
after ninety days, any of his or her content will be permanently 
and irreversibly eliminated from existence. However, the policy 
makes clear that such an assumption would be incorrect.51 The 
policy states that Facebook ―may retain certain information to 
 
49. Id. § 7 
50. Id. 
51. The policy states: 
 
Limitations on removal. Even after you remove 
information from your profile or delete your account, copies 
of that information may remain viewable elsewhere to the 
extent it has been shared with others, it was otherwise 
distributed pursuant to your privacy settings, or it was 
copied or stored by other users. However, your name will no 
longer be associated with that information on Facebook. 
(For example, if you post something to another user‘s profile 
and then you delete your account, that post may remain, but 
be attributed to an ―Anonymous Facebook User.‖) 
Additionally, we may retain certain information to prevent 
identity theft and other misconduct even if deletion has 
been requested. If you have given third party applications or 
websites access to your information, they may retain your 
information to the extent permitted under their terms of 
service or privacy policies. But they will no longer be able to 
access the information through our Platform after you 
disconnect from them. 
 
Id. 
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prevent . . . other misconduct,‖ suggesting that it might store 
some ―deleted‖ content over ninety days old.52 One 
interpretation of this is that Facebook only stores information 
on those whose content was requested via subpoena or 
warrant. Another interpretation is that Facebook is only 
guaranteeing its users recovery of their accounts for up to 
ninety days (perhaps to ensure that the request to delete was 
not a fraudulent request), but in reality, they will keep copies 
of everything for as long as they want. 
 
 3. ―How We Protect Information‖ 
 
In another part of the privacy policy, Facebook states that 
―[w]e do our best to keep your information secure‖ by keeping 
account information on a secured service behind a firewall.53 
However, it explicitly states that the only information that it 
encrypts ―using socket layer technology (SSL)‖ is ―sensitive 
information (such as credit card numbers and passwords).‖54 
This portion of the policy also makes clear that Facebook 
employees may use ―automated and social measures‖ to 
―analyz[e] account behavior for fraudulent or otherwise 
anomalous behavior, may limit use of site features in response 
to possible signs of abuse, may remove inappropriate content or 
links to illegal content, and may suspend or disable accounts 
for violations of our Statement of Rights and 
Responsibilities.‖55 
Finally, this section concludes with a general disclaimer 
warning users to never assume that their information will stay 
out of others‘ hands: 
 
Risks inherent in sharing information. 
Although we allow you to set privacy options that 
limit access to your information, please be aware 
that no security measures are perfect or 
impenetrable. We cannot control the actions of 
 
52. Id. 
53. Id. § 8. 
54. Id. 
55. Id. 
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other users with whom you share your 
information. We cannot guarantee that only 
authorized persons will view your information. 
We cannot ensure that information you share on 
Facebook will not become publicly available. We 
are not responsible for third party circumvention 
of any privacy settings or security measures on 
Facebook.56 
 
Thus, at this point, Facebook users are on notice that 
Facebook employees are monitoring their content and that its 
privacy-protecting measures are neither ―perfect‖ nor 
―impenetrable.‖ 
 
 4. ―Other Terms‖ 
 
Facebook‘s Privacy Policy concludes with the following 
passage, which has been roundly criticized by consumer 
privacy advocates: 
 
Changes. We may change this Privacy Policy 
pursuant to the procedures outlined in the 
Facebook Statement of Rights and 
Responsibilities. Unless stated otherwise, our 
current privacy policy applies to all information 
that we have about you and your account. If we 
make changes to this Privacy Policy we will 
notify you by publication here and on the 
Facebook Site Governance Page. You can make 
sure that you receive notice directly by becoming 
a fan of the Facebook Site Governance Page.57 
 
This policy effectively states that even if a user has a 
subjective and reasonable expectation of privacy with regard to 
various content, Facebook can unilaterally kill that expectation 
without affirmatively contacting her. A user would have to 
 
56. Id. 
57. Id. § 9. 
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check the Privacy Policy or the Facebook Site Governance Page 
on a daily basis to ensure that the policies have not changed. 
Even if one were to lose street credibility ―by directly liking the 
Facebook Site Governance Page,‖ she would not necessarily 
receive the notice of policy changes unless she logged in soon 
after the changes were made.58 
This policy ended up being the source of much ire when 
Facebook recently announced that all users‘ names, profile 
photos, and the fact that they are Facebook users would be 
public information. Thus, a user who created a Facebook 
account in 2007 might have joined under the belief that only 
her selected ―friends‖ would know that she was on Facebook. 
But today, all of her un-close friends and colleagues can find 
out that she has a Facebook account and grill her about why 
she has not ―friended‖ them yet. 
 
 5. ―How We Use Your Information‖ 
 
Given Facebook‘s ability to unilaterally change its policy 
without your consent, one final policy is worth noting here: 
 
Memorializing Accounts. If we are notified 
that a user is deceased, we may memorialize the 
user‘s account. In such cases we restrict profile 
access to confirmed friends, and allow friends 
and family to write on the user‘s Wall in 
remembrance. We may close an account if we 
receive a formal request from the user‘s next of 
kin or other proper legal request to do so.59 
 
In other words, if a Facebook user wants to be absolutely 
sure that her photos, list of friends, purchases, private 
messages, and Farmville scores will not be released to the 
general public for Google to permanently archive, she would be 
wise to heed the following advice: Don‘t die; keep yourself alive 
by checking the Facebook Site Governance Page every day. 
 
58. Id. 
59. Id. § 5. 
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D. Facebook‟s Terms of Service 
 
Facebook‘s ―Statement of Rights and Responsibilities,‖ 
which was last revised on October 4, 2010, also provides that: 
 
 1. Privacy 
 
Your privacy is very important to us. We 
designed our Privacy Policy to make important 
disclosures about how you can use Facebook to 
share with others and how we collect and can use 
your content and information. We encourage you 
to read the Privacy Policy, and to use it to help 
make informed decisions.60 
 
This statement does nothing to modify the privacy policies 
discussed above. 
However, in the next section, Facebook reserves the right 
to distribute any content ―covered by intellectual property 
rights,‖ regardless of one‘s privacy settings. The policy states: 
 
 2. Sharing Your Content and Information 
 
You own all of the content and information you 
post on Facebook, and you can control how it is 
shared through your privacy and application 
settings. In addition: 
For content that is covered by intellectual 
property rights, like photos and videos (―IP 
content‖), you specifically give us the following 
permission, subject to your privacy and 
application settings: you grant us a non-
exclusive, transferable, sub-licensable, royalty-
free, worldwide license to use any IP content that 
you post on or in connection with Facebook (―IP 
License‖). This IP License ends when you delete 
 
60. Facebook Statement of Rights and Responsibilities, FACEBOOK, 
http://www.facebook.com/policy.php#!/terms.php (last visited Oct. 30, 2010). 
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your IP content or your account unless your 
content has been shared with others, and they 
have not deleted it.61 
 
Later in the terms, Facebook defines the word ―use‖: 
 
17. Definitions 
. . . 
By ―use‖ we mean use, copy, publicly perform or 
display, distribute, modify, translate, and create 
derivative works of.62 
 
In essence, Facebook owns most of your data.63 
The policy seems designed to protect Facebook‘s right to 
reproduce and disseminate digital copies of a user‘s intellectual 
property without violating intellectual property statutes like 
the Copyright Act of 1976. For example, if the Facebook group 
―Students Against Backpacks with Wheels‖64 were to 
trademark a logo or create a music video promoting its 
message, the policy gives Facebook a legal right to display the 
logo and play the video on others‘ Facebook feeds. 
Moreover, the ―subject to your privacy and application 
settings‖ limitation suggests that Facebook does not have the 
license to distribute a user‘s intellectual property beyond the 
user‘s approved distribution list. Thus, if the Facebook group 
―Asian people with super White first-names, and super Asian 
 
61. Id. § 2. 
62. Id. § 17. 
63. See generally, 18 U.S.C. §§ 101, 102, 106, 107, 117 (2005). Because 
copyrights do not rely upon registration like trademarks, a user‘s ―status‖ 
may even be considered an original work created by copyright, assuming that 
the ―tangible medium‖ rule of copyright law if fulfilled. 
64. Students against Backpacks with Wheels, FACEBOOK, 
http://www.facebook.com/pages/GLOBAL/Students-Against-Backpacks-with-
Wheels/229901724576?v=wall (last visited Oct. 30, 2010). Technically, this is 
a ―page‖ and not a ―group.‖ However, according to Facebook‘s blog, ―[P]ages 
were designed to be the official profiles for entities, such as celebrities, 
brands or businesses.‖ Nick Pineda, Facebook Tips: What‟s the Difference 
Between a Facebook Page and Group?, THE FACEBOOK BLOG (Feb. 24, 2010, 
4:40 PM), http://blog.facebook.com/blog.php?post=324706977130. 
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last-names :D‖65 were to create a baby-naming book intended 
for and only distributed to ―fans,‖ Facebook would presumably 
be restrained from disseminating the book beyond the 
approved list. 
However, the above interpretations are based on 
limitations not clearly written into the contract. Indeed, one 
reasonable and textual interpretation of the policy is that, once 
a user has shared a photo with another person who does not 
―delete‖ the content, Facebook has an irrevocable license to 
distribute the photo to whomever it wants. Even if the user 
deletes the photo or closes her account, Facebook still 
maintains the license to distribute it since the ―content has 
been shared with others, and they have not deleted it.‖66 
On almost any other site, such ambiguities in the fine 
print of a policy on intellectual property would not trigger the 
barrage of angry privacy-related criticisms that Facebook has 
received. But in the context of Mark Zuckerberg‘s philosophy of 
openness67 and Facebook‘s general movement toward liberating 
personal information, the concerns do not seem out of place. 68 
 
65. Asian People with Super White First Names and Super Asian Last 
Names, FACEBOOK, http://www.facebook.com/pages/Asian-people-with-super-
White-first-names-and-super-Asian-last-names-D/111620102193432 (last 
visited Nov. 8, 2010). Unfortunately, because neither Westlaw nor Lexis 
allows a search for just ―:D‖ due to their restrictions on searches for colons (of 
the punctuation variety), I am unable to confirm whether this is the first law 
review article to include an emoticon. 
66. Facebook Statement of Rights and Responsibilities, supra note 60. 
Since most content on Facebook is not ―received‖ in the same way that e-mail 
might be received in an inbox, the likelihood that a Facebook user ―deletes‖ 
the content is low. The user would have to be motivated to somehow make an 
affirmative, conscious effort to ensure that she can never see the content 
again. 
67. There is a certain irony in his championing openness since he is 
famously press-shy and weary of speaking to the public. See, e.g., Vargas, 
supra note 5. 
68. Of course, the openness championed by Zuckerberg has ultimately 
hurt Facebook‘s reputation, as details continue to emerge about Zuckerberg‘s 
cavalier views on user privacy. For example, in this verified instant message 
transcript, Facebook‘s CEO discussed the access he controlled to Harvard 
students‘ personal information: 
 
ZUCK: Yeah so if you ever need info about anyone at 
Harvard 
ZUCK: Just ask 
24http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol31/iss1/7
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E. Other Social Networking Sites 
 
While Facebook has received more criticism over its 
privacy policies than any other SNS on the Internet, I would be 
remiss not to point out that other social networking sites have 
similar privacy rules with regard to sharing information with 
government authorities. 
MySpace‘s privacy policy, for example, is even more 
amorphous and fuzzy than Facebook‘s policy with regard to 
when it may hand over your private information to the 
government: 
 
There may be instances when MySpace may 
access or disclose PII, Profile Information or non-
PII without providing you a choice in order to: (i) 
protect or defend the legal rights or property of 
MySpace, our Affiliated Companies or their 
employees, agents and contractors (including 
enforcement of our agreements); (ii) protect the 
safety and security of Users of the MySpace 
Services or members of the public including 
acting in urgent circumstances; (iii) protect 
against fraud or for risk management purposes; 
or (iv) comply with the law or legal process.69 
 
ZUCK: I have over 4,000 emails, pictures, addresses, SNS 
[Redacted Friend‘s Name]: What!? How‘d you manage that 
one? 
ZUCK: People just submitted it 
ZUCK: I don‘t know why 
ZUCK: They ―trust me‖ 
ZUCK: Dumb fucks 
 
Nicholas Carlson, Well, These New Zuckerberg IMs Won't Help Facebook's 
Privacy Problems, BUSINESS INSIDER, May 13, 2010, 
http://www.businessinsider.com/well-these-new-zuckerberg-ims-wont-help-
facebooks-privacy-problems-2010-5. In an article that included interviews 
with Zuckerberg and other Facebook executives, the transcript was verified 
as true. See Vargas, supra note 5. 
69. Privacy Policy, MYSPACE, 
http://www.myspace.com/index.cfm?fuseaction=misc.privacy#ixzz10DCqHNz
p (last visited Nov. 8, 2010). 
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Twitter is one of the largest social networks in the United 
States. Like Facebook, Twitter allows users to limit their 
―tweets‖ to specific users.70 In their account settings, Twitter 
users can check a box that states ―Only let people whom I 
approve follow my tweets.‖ 71 But despite this privacy option, 
Twitter, like Facebook, makes clear in its privacy policy that 
users should not assume that any information is actually 
private: 
 
Tweets, Following, Lists and other Public 
Information: Our Services are primarily 
designed to help you share information with the 
world. Most of the information you provide to us 
is information you are asking us to make public. 
This includes not only the messages you Tweet 
and the metadata provided with Tweets, such as 
when you Tweeted, but also the lists you create, 
the people you follow, the Tweets you mark as 
favorites or Retweet and many other bits of 
information. Our default is almost always to 
make the information you provide public but we 
generally give you settings to make the 
information more private if you want. Your 
public information is broadly and instantly 
disseminated. For example, your public Tweets 
are searchable by many search engines and are 
immediately delivered via SMS and our APIs to a 
wide range of users and services. You should be 
careful about all information that will be made 
public by Twitter, not just your Tweets.72 
 
Elsewhere in Twitter‘s policy, the company makes clear that 
 
70. Twitter Privacy Policy, TWITTER, http://twitter.com/privacy (last 
visited Nov. 8, 2010). 
71. See Twitter User Account Settings, TWITTER, 
http://twitter.com/account/settings (last visited Jan. 7, 2011). If that box is 
not checked, the default is that the information is public. See Twitter Privacy 
Policy, supra note 70. 
72. Twitter Privacy Policy, supra note 70. 
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any private information can be disclosed to the government 
upon a ―legal request‖: 
 
Law and Harm: We may disclose your 
information if we believe that it is reasonably 
necessary to comply with a law, regulation or 
legal request; to protect the safety of any person; 
to address fraud, security or technical issues; or 
to protect Twitter‘s rights or property.73 
 
After reviewing the privacy policies of all top twenty five 
social networking sites,74 I have concluded that they all refuse 
to limit the disclosure of personal information to responses to 
warrants or subpoenas. These other sites will disclose 
information to ―comply with relevant laws,‖75 ―unless required 
by law,‖76 or ―when necessary to comply with a law.‖77 In fact, a 
few SNS are more ―cooperative‖ than Facebook, stating the 
intent to disclose any information that might possibly be 
illegal.78 
 
73. Id. 
74. Andy Kazeniac, Social Networks: Facebook Takes Over Top Spot, 
Twitter Climbs, COMPETEPULSE, http://blog.compete.com/2009/02/09/facebook-
myspace-twitter-social-network/ (last visited Nov. 8, 2010). 
75. Privacy Policy, STUMBLEUPON, http://www.stumbleupon.com/privacy/ 
(last visited Nov. 8, 2010). 
76. Delicious Privacy Policy, YAHOO!, 
http://info.yahoo.com/privacy/us/delicious/ (last visited Nov. 8, 2010). 
77. About: Privacy Policy, DIGG, http://about.digg.com/privacy (last 
visited Nov. 8, 2010). 
78. Classmates.com, for example, states that it will disclose ―as may be 
permitted or required by law, regulation, rule or court order; pursuant to 
requests from governmental, regulatory or administrative agencies or law 
enforcement authorities; or to prevent, investigate, identify persons or 
organizations potentially involved in, or take any action regarding suspected 
fraud, violations of our Terms of Service, or activity that appears to us to be 
illegal or may expose us to legal liability.‖ Privacy Policy, CLASSMATES, 
http://www.classmates.com/cm/reg/privacy (last visited Nov. 8, 2010). 
Similarly, Meetup.com states that the user will ―authorize us to disclose any 
information about you to law enforcement or other government officials as 
we, in our sole discretion, believe necessary or appropriate, in connection 
with an investigation of fraud, intellectual property infringements, or other 
activity that is illegal or may expose us or you to legal liability.‖ Meetup 
Privacy Policy Statement, MEETUP, http://www.meetup.com/privacy/ (last 
visited Nov. 8, 2010). 
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III. How the Government Uses Facebook to Investigate 
 
“If you have something you don‟t want anyone to know, maybe 
you shouldn‟t be doing it in the first place.” 
- Google CEO Eric Schmidt79 
 
There is no doubt that the federal government is 
increasingly relying on social networking sites like Facebook to 
investigate crimes. After submitting a Freedom of Information 
Act request, the Electronic Frontier Foundation recently 
obtained a Justice Department memorandum that makes clear 
that the government does, indeed, use them.80 According to the 
―UTILITY IN CRIMINAL CASES‖ portion of the 
memorandum, agents can use evidence from SNS to establish 
crime, provide location information, establish motives, prove 
and disprove alibis, and reveal communications.81 
While no further specifics are provided, the broad 
categories suggest multiple ways in which Facebook serves as a 
valuable government investigative tool. For starters, agents 
can determine a suspect‘s friends and potentially yield 
informants or witnesses. They can comb through photos to look 
for stolen merchandise, weapons, or automobiles. 
The site is also incredibly useful for prosecutors and police 
to identify and establish connections between individuals. For 
example, officers at the University of Illinois at Urbana-
Champaign spotted two students urinating in public, but only 
managed to apprehend one of them, Adam Gartner.82 When 
police asked about the other student‘s identity, Gartner falsely 
 
79. Interview by Maria Bartiromo with Eric Schmidt, CEO, Google, (Dec. 
3, 2009), available at http://gawker.com/5419271/google-ceo-secrets-are-for-
filthy-people. 
80. John Lynch & Jenny Ellickson, U.S. Dept. of Justice, Computer 
Crime and Intellectual Property Section, Obtaining and Using Evidence from 
Social Networking Sites: Facebook, MySpace, Linkedln, and More, (Mar. 
2010), available at 
http://www.eff.org/files/filenode/social_network/20100303__crim_socialnetwor
king.pdf. 
81. Id. 
82. Kiyoshi Martinez, Student Arrested after Police Facebook Him, DAILY 
ILLINI, Aug. 1, 2006, http://www.dailyillini.com/news/2006/08/01/student-
arrested-after-police-facebook-him. 
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claimed that he did not know him.83 Gartner was eventually 
charged with obstruction of justice when the arresting officer 
obtained the other student‘s name from witnesses and 
established through Facebook that the two were friends.84 
The ways in which government authorities have obtained 
information on Facebook vary, however. As will be discussed in 
Parts III and IV, the various ways in which government 
authorities have obtained information from Facebook pose 
different constitutional and privacy-related questions. 
 
A. Plain View 
 
Despite Facebook‘s privacy controls and the increasing 
awareness of privacy issues, much of the thirty billion pieces of 
content created each month remains viewable and searchable 
by the public.85 There is no way to know why each of those 
pieces of content is public: a user may have intentionally 
sought to reveal it to the world, she may have been confused or 
mistaken about the privacy setting she chose, or she might 
have simply failed to make any active efforts to opt out of the 
public settings. 
However, given the frequent changes to Facebook‘s privacy 
policy and the unwieldy process to opt out of sharing, which 
were discussed above, I suspect that consumer confusion and 
unawareness explain a substantial amount of the public 
content. To test this suspicion, I conducted a search for the 
exact phrase ―new number is‖ on a website called 
YourOpenbook.org, which lets visitors search public Facebook 
updates using Facebook‘s own search service.86 Openbook 
 
83. Id. 
84. Id. 
85. In 2008, the Director of National Intelligence released a study that 
concluded that government-hired Internet investigators were able to find 
―noteworthy‖ results on social networking sites for over half of a study‘s 349 
participants. Office of the Dir. of Nat‘l Intelligence, Considering Web Presence 
in Determining Eligibility to Access Classified Information: A Pilot Study, 
(June 10, 2010), available at 
http://www.eff.org/files/20100514_odni_socialnetworking.pdf. 
86. OPENBOOK, http://youropenbook.org/about.html (last visited Jan. 7, 
2011). The site is entirely unaffiliated with Facebook; it merely operates as a 
search engine for publicly available Facebook information. 
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revealed over a hundred ―hits‖ of Facebook users who revealed 
their new phone numbers.87 While every announcement might 
have been intentionally broadcast to the world,88 I suspect that 
most on the list would be surprised to learn that their new 
digits are public. For example, I doubt that Grayson Frederick, 
one of the many Facebook users whose public page was 
revealed in the search results, actually intended to tell the 
world that his ―new number is 208 405 35[XX]‖ and that he has 
―unlimited txting so feel free to txt or call anytime.‖89 
Regardless, I unearthed many articles covering criminal 
investigations conducted with the aid of Facebook; the majority 
of them involved evidence that was available to the public. 
Again, while this fact does not necessarily prove that the 
content was unknowingly shared to all, it is hard to assume 
that the thousands of Americans arrested because of evidence 
on Facebook were choosing to self-incriminate themselves. 
For example, twenty-year-old Hadley Jons was ejected 
from a jury and found in contempt of court for posting on 
Facebook that ―it‘s gonna be fun to tell the defendant they‘re 
guilty‖ before the defense even presented its case.90 The 
defendant‘s lawyer‘s son discovered her post on Facebook 
during the trial by conducting searches for the jurors‘ names.91 
The judge ordered her to pay a $250 fine and write an essay on 
the Sixth Amendment.92 
A different type of ―plain view‖ took place when the 
 
87. OPENBOOK, 
http://youropenbook.org/?q=%22new+number+is%22&gender=any (last 
visited Jan. 7, 2011). 
88. Admittedly, the phone book in every city is a thick collection of 
people who consented to their names and phone numbers being freely 
disseminated. 
89. Grayson Frederick, FACEBOOK (Sept. 26, 2010, 12:48 AM), 
http://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=100000726944748&v=wall. I deleted 
the last two digits of his phone number in the unlikely event that there is an 
overlap between readers of the Pace Law Review and people likely to respond 
to Grayson Frederick‘s requests to ―call anytime.‖ 
90. Martha Neil, Oops, Juror Calls Defendant Guilty on Facebook, Before 
Verdict, A.B.A J., Sept. 2, 2010, 
http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/oops._juror_calls_defendant_guilty_o
n_facebook_though_verdict_isnt_in. 
91. Id. 
92. Id. 
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Federal Bureau of Investigations (FBI) was hunting down Maxi 
Sopo, who was wanted in Seattle on bank fraud charges but 
managed to elude authorities.93 When investigators learned 
that he had a private Facebook page with a public friend list, 
they learned that one of his friends happened to be a former 
employee of the Justice Department who was unaware of his 
alleged criminal escapades and contacted him.94 With the help 
of the former employee, the FBI eventually captured and 
arrested Sopo—all without the need to resort to any warrants, 
subpoenas, or undercover reporting.95 
While legal scholars may disagree about what types of 
content on social media sites are intended to fall within the 
―plain view‖ exception to the Fourth Amendment‘s search 
restrictions, there is one infamous arrest triggered by Facebook 
evidence that no self-respecting attorney would seek to exclude 
on Fourth Amendment grounds. On August 28, 2009, nineteen-
year-old Jonathan G. Parker allegedly broke into a home in 
Fort Loudoun, Pennsylvania and stole two diamond rings 
worth more than $3,500.96 He may not have ever been caught, 
but for the fact that the victim noticed on his computer monitor 
that somebody named Jonathan G. Parker had logged onto 
Facebook and failed to sign out of the account before leaving 
with the jewels.97 
 
B. Government Subpoenas, Warrants, and Requests 
 
Government entities seeking to subpoena electronic 
communication from Facebook or any other Internet service 
provider without the subscriber or member‘s permission must 
wade through a muddled maze of outdated laws. As discussed 
in Parts III and IV below, federal courts in both civil and 
 
93. Sammy Rose Saltzman, Partying Fugitive Maxi Sopo after Friending 
Fed on Facebook, CBSNEWS.COM (Oct. 16, 2009, 9:44 AM), 
http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-504083_162-5383869-504083.html. 
94. Id. 
95. Id. 
96. See Edward Marshall, Burglar Leaves His Facebook Page on Victim‟s 
Computer, JOURNAL-NEWS.NET (Sept. 16, 2009), http://www.journal-
news.net/page/content.detail/id/525232.html. 
97. Id. 
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criminal cases have inconsistently interpreted the 
constitutional and statutory protections on electronic data 
sought by a subpoena.98 
However, as muddled as the law may be, Facebook has 
unilaterally simplified the requirements by requiring warrants 
for only private messages less than 181 days old. Through its 
spectacularly vague privacy policies, it has reserved the right 
to disclose all other content.99 
In the Justice Department memorandum obtained by the 
EFF, the section titled ―GETTING INFO FROM FACEBOOK‖ 
briefly discusses the ―standard data productions‖ (or non-
content) available: ―Neoprint, Photoprint, User Contact Info, 
Group Contact Info, IP Logs.‖100 But as for everything else, the 
memorandum cryptically states: ―HOWEVER, Facebook has 
other data available. Often cooperative with emergency 
requests.‖101 
Because the memorandum discusses data, policies, and 
experiences with multiple SNS, it makes clear that Facebook is 
far more ―cooperative‖ than other sites. For example, ―MySpace 
requires a search warrant for private messages/bulletins less 
than 181 days old‖ and ―considers friend lists to be stored 
content.‖102 The significance of this will be discussed in Part III. 
 
C. Fake Profiles 
 
The Justice Department memorandum obtained by the 
EFF also revealed that federal agents are creating fake 
identities on Facebook (among other SNS sites) to obtain 
 
98. Compare In re DoubleClick, Inc. Privacy Litig., 154 F. Supp. 2d 497, 
512 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (holding that only unopened e-mail on an ISP server 
constituted ―electronic storage‖), with Theofel v. Farey-Jones, 359 F.3d 1066, 
1076-77 (9th Cir. 2004) (holding that copies of opened e-mails on an ISP 
server constitutes electronic storage). These laws will be discussed more in 
detail infra. 
99. See Facebook Privacy Policy, supra note 26. Because Facebook does 
not clearly offer any protections beyond those required by statute, it has 
implicitly reserved the right to disclose the contents of private messages 
without any warrant or subpoena. 
100. Lynch & Ellickson, supra note 80, at 17. 
101. Id. 
102. Id. at 22. 
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evidence, search for witnesses, and track suspects.103 Even 
though Facebook‘s policies ban Facebook users from providing 
false information or creating an account in another person‘s 
name, government agencies regularly create them in hopes 
that suspects (or suspects‘ friends) will approve the request and 
instantly allow them to access private information, map social 
networks, and begin the process of luring them into 
incriminating revelations. 
In one section on working undercover on social networking 
sites, the document poses but does not answer the question: 
―[i]f agents violate terms of service, is that ‗otherwise illegal 
activity‘?‖104 No caselaw provides a clear answer. However, as 
discussed below, given the general legality of undercover 
operations in which officers violate crimes in order to prevent 
crimes, there seems to be no legal barrier to these fake profile 
tactics. 
When asked about this technique, many police 
departments around the country have freely offered that they 
have ―no reservations about going undercover on Facebook – 
taking on a fake identity and tricking a suspect into accepting 
a police department employee as a friend.‖105 One officer 
defended the legality of the practice by stating that ―[i]t‘s no 
different than putting on a pizza guy uniform and knocking on 
the door.‖106 
Adam Bauer, a college student in Wisconsin, is one of 
many victims of this practice. Not long after he accepted an 
offer to become Facebook friends with ―a good-looking girl‖ that 
he ―randomly accepted this once for some reason,‖ the La 
Crosse police invited him to the station, showed him photos 
from Facebook of him holding a beer, and then ticketed him for 
underage drinking.107 
 
103. Id. at 32-33. 
104. Id. at 32. 
105. Julie Masis, Is this Lawman your Facebook Friend?, BOSTON GLOBE, 
Jan. 11, 2009, 
http://www.boston.com/news/local/articles/2009/01/11/is_this_lawman_your_f
acebook_friend?mode=PF. 
106. Id. 
107. KJ Lang, Facebook Friend Turns into Big Brother, LA CROSSE 
TRIBUNE, Nov. 19, 2009, 
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In an interview emphasizing Facebook‘s commitment to a 
―real name culture,‖ Facebook spokesman Simon Axten stated 
that it ―would not make an exception‖ with regard to the rule 
against assuming fake identities, even ―for police officers 
working undercover.‖108 Axten claims that the company 
―disable[s] the accounts of people operating under 
pseudonyms.‖ However, the fact that this practice might violate 
Facebook‘s rules, and even the fact that violating Facebook‘s 
rules might itself constitute a crime,109 still does not amount to 
a legal rule that prevents the police from engaging in this 
practice. This is discussed more in Part III-D below. 
 
D. Voluntary Disclosure from Facebook 
 
Facebook has openly acknowledged that it polices its site to 
protect children from sexual predators. As of January 2009, the 
company has removed more than 5,500 convicted sex offenders 
from its site.110 Chris Kelly, Facebook‘s chief privacy officer, 
revealed some of its practices: 
 
We have devoted significant resources to 
developing innovative and complex systems to 
proactively monitor the site and its users, 
including those not on a sex offender registry, for 
suspicious activity (such as contacting minors or 
users of predominantly one gender). 
. . . 
If we find that someone on a sex offender registry 
is a likely match to a user on Facebook, we notify 
law enforcement and disable the account. In 
 
http://lacrossetribune.com/news/local/article_0ff40f7a-d4d1-11de-afb3-
001cc4c002e0.html. 
108. Masis, supra note 105. 
109. For example, a high school student in Georgia was recently 
arrested for criminal defamation for creating a Facebook account in the name 
of another student. Melissa Tune, Teen Arrested for Fake Facebook Account in 
Teacher Firing Case, WRDW.COM (Aug. 11, 2010, 4:09 PM), 
http://www.wrdw.com/crimeteam12/headlines/100284224.html. 
110. Marlon A. Walker, Facebook Gives Sex Offenders the Boot, 
MSNBC.COM, Feb. 19, 2009, http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/29289048/. 
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some cases, law enforcement has asked us to 
leave the accounts active so that they may 
investigate the user further.111 
 
Despite these proactive efforts, Facebook has been criticized for 
not doing enough to protect children,112 especially after stories 
surfaced about how child abusers and rapists used Facebook to 
lure their underage victims.113 
 
E. Voluntary Disclosure from Third Parties 
 
Facebook users have often reported, forwarded, or provided 
law enforcement agents with access to evidence of crimes, 
especially when children or life-threatening emergencies are 
involved. For example, one Pennsylvania high school student‘s 
father was arrested by police when another student saw 
pictures of the party that he threw for students after a 
basketball game.114 According to the affidavit, thirty-six-year-
old Steven Russo hosted a basement party for underage high 
school students, provided them with rum and vodka, shared 
―sex stories about all the girls he has been with,‖ and 
instructed the cheerleaders to use a stripper pole that he had 
installed.115 The police obtained the photos after a student saw 
the photos on Facebook and shared them with the high school 
cheerleading coach, who handed them over to the police.116 
 
111. Erick Schonfeld, Thousands of MySpace Sex Offender Refugees 
Found on Facebook, TECHCRUNCH (Feb.3, 2009), 
http://techcrunch.com/2009/02/03/thousands-of-myspace-sex-offender-
refugees-found-on-facebook/. 
112. Id. (suggesting that the ninety thousand registered sex offenders 
that MySpace had removed were making their way over to Facebook). 
113. See, e.g., Catharine Smith, Serial Sex Offender Admits Using 
Facebook to Rape and Murder Teen, HUFFINGTON POST (Mar. 8, 2010), 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2010/03/08/peter-chapman-admits-
usin_n_489674.html. 
114. Dad‟s Teen “Stripper Pole” Party, Cops: Pennslyvania Man Threw 
Alcohol-Filled Basement Bash, THE SMOKING GUN, Mar. 2, 2009, 
http://www.thesmokinggun.com/documents/crime/dads-teen-stripper-pole-
party. 
115. Id. 
116. Id. 
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In other cases, authorities use Facebook to obtain leads, 
interview witnesses, or gain information on others. For 
example, police in Indiana, Pennsylvania were searching for 
two men who torched a couch after the Pittsburgh Steelers 
emerged victorious in Super Bowl XLIII. Despite the innate 
human need to burn furniture after a live sporting event, police 
nonetheless used publicly-available Facebook photos to find the 
suspects. Then, they contacted the owner of the page in which 
the photos were found; he identified them as Ryan Gould and 
Adam Alhabashi, who were arrested shortly thereafter.117 
 
F. Data-Mining Technologies 
 
Facebook‘s collection and aggregation of data has provided 
a vast amount of information to ―responsible companies.‖ There 
is no evidence that Facebook has provided this data to the 
United States government. 
There was, however, a federal government agency that 
sought to collect the exact information that Facebook possesses. 
In 2002, it was discovered that the purpose of the Information 
Awareness Office (IAO), which is under the Defense 
Department‘s Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency 
(DARPA), was to gather as much information as possible about 
everyone in a centralized location for easy perusal by the 
government.118 The IAO stated that its mission was to collect 
as much information as possible, including Internet searches, 
credit card activity, medical records, tax returns, airline 
purchases, educational transcripts, utility bills, car rentals, 
and driver‘s licenses.119 
While there is no evidence of a direct relationship between 
Facebook and the IAO, they are, at most, only two degrees of 
separation apart. In 2005, Facebook received 12.7 million 
 
117. Facebook Pic Leads to Arrest in Super Bowl Celebration, 
PITTSBURGHCHANNEL.COM (Feb. 6, 2009 11:17 A.M.), 
http://www.thepittsburghchannel.com/r/18656797/detail.html. 
118. See John Markoff, Pentagon Plans a Computer System that Would 
Peek at Personal Data of Americans, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 9, 2002, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2002/11/09/politics/09COMP.html?pagewanted=1. 
119. Jeffrey W. Seifert, Cong. Research Serv., RL31798, Data Mining 
and Homeland Security: An Overview 6 (2007). 
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dollars from the ACCEL venture capital firm, whose manager, 
James Breyer, sits on Facebook‘s board.120 Breyer also founded 
a research and development firm known as BBN technologies, 
which hired Dr. Anita Jones,121 who previously served as 
DARPA‘s Director of Research and Engineering122 and oversaw 
the IAO‘s efforts to gather data on the nation‘s citizenry. 
But more importantly, no direct relationship between 
Facebook and the IAO is needed to the extent that the 
government can still collect vast amounts of information from 
Facebook through any of the means listed above. 
 
IV. Facebook Privacy under the Fourth Amendment 
 
Criminal investigations by government officials are subject 
to the constraints of the Fourth Amendment of the United 
States Constitution, which provides: 
 
The right of the people to be secure in their 
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against 
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be 
violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon 
probable cause, supported by Oath or 
affirmation, and particularly describing the place 
to be searched, and the persons or things to be 
seized.123 
 
Its ―overriding function‖ is to ―protect personal privacy and 
dignity against unwarranted intrusion by the State.‖124 
The Fourth Amendment applies whenever a government 
 
120. Erick Schonfeld, Jim Breyer: Extra $500 Million Round for 
Facebook a “Total Fiction,‖ TECHCRUNCH, 
http://techcrunch.com/2007/11/02/jim-breyer-extra-500-million-round-for-
facebook-a-total-fiction/. 
121. On the Move, DEFENSE NEWS, Nov. 8, 2004, at 19, available at 2004 
WLNR 23679109. 
122. Anita Jones, UNIV. OF VA., 
http://www.cs.virginia.edu/people/faculty/faculty.php?member=jones (last 
visited Feb. 1, 2011). 
123. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
124. Schmberber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 767 (1966). 
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official implements a search or seizure. Under the Fourth 
Amendment, a ―search‖ includes searches of an individual, her 
pockets, private property, residence, office, hotel room, and 
luggage. 
Prior to 1967, the Court interpreted the Fourth 
Amendment literally, such that only official searches of a 
person or his tangible effects were protected.125 But since the 
Court‘s decision in Katz v. United States, the literal approach 
has been abandoned in favor of protecting ―people, not 
places.‖126 The Court held that ―[w]hat a person knowingly 
exposes to the public, even in his own home or office, is not a 
subject of Fourth Amendment protection. . . . But what he 
seeks to preserve as private, even in an area accessible to the 
public, may be constitutionally protected.‖127 
Katz implemented a two-step approach that looks to the 
reasonableness of a search or seizure.128 Under this test, ―there 
is a twofold requirement, first that a person have exhibited an 
actual (subjective) expectation of privacy and, second, that the 
expectation be one that society is prepared to recognize as 
‗reasonable.‘‖129 
For a search to be reasonable, government officials must 
usually obtain a warrant from a judge or magistrate by 
demonstrating probable cause to conduct a search.130 Probable 
cause requires ―reasonably trustworthy information‖ sufficient 
to ―warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief that an 
offense has been or is being committed‖ and that evidence will 
be found in the specific place to be searched.131 A warrantless 
search is only reasonable if it falls into one of many exceptions 
to the rule, such as exigent circumstances,132 ―hot pursuit‖ 
 
125. See Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 466 (1928). 
126. 389 U.S. 347, 352 (1967). 
127. Id. (internal citation omitted) 
128. Id. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring). 
129. Id. 
130. U.S. CONST. amend. IV; see also Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 
132, 156 (1925). 
131. Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160,176 (1949) (citing Carroll v. 
United States, 267 U.S. 132, 156 (1925)). 
132. Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 299 (1967); United States v. 
Santana, 427 U.S. 38, 43 (1976). 
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chases,133 protective sweeps of a vehicle,134 or searches of a 
person incident to a lawful arrest.135 
 
A. Plain View Exception 
 
With regard to SNS searches, the most relevant exception 
is that government officials do not need a warrant to observe 
something in ―plain view.‖ Under this rule, if a government 
official has a legal right to be in a specific location, she may 
obtain evidence that is in public or plain view.136 Under the 
―open field‖ doctrine, this rule extends to warrantless 
administrative searches of outdoor property through the use of 
aerial photography.137 This plain view exception engendered 
the three doctrines below, which further diminish the reach of 
the exclusionary rule. 
 
B. Voluntary Disclosure Doctrine 
  
The ―voluntary disclosure doctrine,‖ as announced by the 
Court in Katz, states that any information that is voluntarily 
conveyed to a third party does not receive Fourth Amendment 
protection.138 Thus, the government does not engage in a 
Fourth Amendment ―search‖ when using information a 
defendant disclosed to another individual, even when that 
conversation took place in private.139 This doctrine would 
therefore apply to the overwhelming majority, if not all, 
content on Facebook since it is information that a Facebook 
user voluntarily agrees to have held in third party storage. 
 
 
 
133. Hayden, 387 U.S. at 310 (Fortas, J., concurring). 
134. United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 809 (1982). 
135. United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 234 (1973). 
136. See v. City of Seattle, 387 U.S. 541, 545 (1967). 
137. Dow Chem. Co. v. United States, 476 U.S. 227, 235 (1986). 
138. Katz, 389 U.S. at 351. 
139. Marc J. Zwillinger & Christian S. Genetski, Criminal Discovery of 
Internet Communications under the Stored Communications Act: It‟s Not a 
Level Playing Field, 97 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 569, 574 (2007). 
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C. Private Search and Seizure Doctrine 
 
The principles behind the voluntary disclosure doctrine 
have been further stretched to mostly forbid the exclusionary 
rule from extending to ―private‖ or nonpolice searches. In 
Burdeau v. McDowell, the Court held that the history of the 
Fourth Amendment was intended to restrain ―the activities of 
sovereign authority‖ and not intended to limit anyone else.140 
Indeed, even if a private person such as a ―mall cop‖ or private 
detective has the role of investigating criminal conduct, then 
the Court would likely admit the evidence.141 Thus, there is 
usually no reasonable expectation of privacy to information 
that someone voluntarily discloses to a third party who 
independently chooses to forward the material to the police. 
However, if the government orders, requests, helps plan, or 
tacitly approves a private person‘s search, the Court has 
applied the exclusionary rule.142 
 
D. Misplaced Trust Doctrine 
 
Another important spinoff of the plain view rule is the 
misplaced trust doctrine, which may apply when a Facebook 
user voluntarily discloses information to someone who turns 
out to be an undercover officer.143 Under this doctrine, a person 
who mistakenly places her trust in someone who turns out to 
be an informant or government agent does not maintain any 
privacy rights under the Fourth Amendment.144 The Court has 
repeatedly refused to adopt the rule that ―the Fourth 
Amendment protects a wrongdoer‘s misplaced belief that a 
person to whom he voluntarily confides his wrongdoing will not 
 
140. 256 U.S. 465, 475 (1921). 
141. See, e.g., United States v. Francoeur, 547 F.2d 891 (5th Cir. 1977) 
(holding that search by security personnel of privately-operated amusement 
park did not amount to violation of Fourth Amendment rights). 
142. See Walter v. United States, 747 U.S. 649 (1980). 
143. See Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293 (1966); Lewis v. United 
States, 385 U.S. 206 (1966); Lopez v. United States, 373 U.S. 427 (1963). 
144. See, e.g., Jacqueline E. Ross, The Place of Covert Surveillance in 
Democratic Societies: A Comparative Study of the United States and 
Germany, 55 AM. J. COMP. L. 493 (2007). 
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reveal it.‖145 
Thus, the government has the authority to use undercover 
operatives to prevent crime.146 More specifically, the Ninth 
Circuit has held that government officials must be allowed to 
take on reasonable false identities in order to be more 
convincing in their undercover operations.147 
Accordingly, undercover agents can use deception to 
procure consent to a search. In Hoffa v. United States, for 
example, the Court noted the possibility that someone will be 
observed by undercover officers is ―the kind of risk we 
necessarily assume‖ and ―inherent in the conditions of human 
society.‖148 While some questioned Hoffa‘s validity after Katz, 
the Court in United States v. White reaffirmed the rule that a 
person does not have any ―justifiable expectation of privacy‖ 
when making incriminating statements to an informer.149 
No federal statute or court has yet had occasion to draw 
any boundaries or rules regulating undercover policing on the 
Internet. Thus, suppose that Semion Mogilevich, who is on the 
FBI‘s list of Top Ten Most Wanted Fugitives, has a Facebook 
page.150 Would a government agent be forbidden from creating 
a Facebook account in Semion‘s mother‘s name, uploading an 
actual photo of her, and naively hoping that he might divulge 
his whereabouts? While virtually every government agent to 
whom I asked this question concluded that this would be ―going 
 
145. Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293, 302 (1966). 
146. Jacobson v. United States, 503 U.S. 540, 548 (1992). 
147. See United States v. McQuin, 612 F.2d 1193, 1195 (9th Cir. 1980). 
148. Hoffa, 385 U.S. at 303 (quoting Lopez v. United States, 373 U.S. 
427, 465 (1963) (Brennan, J., dissenting)). 
149. 401 U.S. 745 (1971). Technically, only a four-person plurality held 
that a person does not have any ―justifiable expectation of privacy‖ when 
making incriminating statements to an informer. However, Justice Black 
concurred because he believed the Fourth Amendment was inapplicable to 
conversations. 
150. FBI - Semion Mogilevich, FBI, 
http://www.fbi.gov/wanted/topten/fugitives/mogilevich_s.htm (last visited 
Nov. 8, 2010). There is a Semion Mogilevich who has a Facebook page. 
Semion Mogilevich, FACEBOOK, http://www.facebook.com/people/Semion-
Mogilevich/100000602506384 (last visited Jan. 31, 2011). Unfortunately, I do 
not know whether the user is actually named Semion Mogilevich or whether 
he is the person wanted by the FBI. Unfortunately, my passion for scholarly 
research stops at sending friendship requests to wanted criminals. 
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too far,‖ neither the agents nor I have found any federal 
precedent restricting such a deceptive practice. 
Thus, only state law or a congressional statute can protect 
private conversations from being surreptitiously documented. 
For example, the Massachusetts Supreme Court interpreted 
Article 14 of the state‘s Declaration of Rights to mean that its 
citizens can reasonably expect that their private conversations 
held in private homes are not being electronically transmitted 
or recorded by undercover government agents.151 
 
E. Application of the Fourth Amendment to New Technologies 
 
But courts have struggled to apply all these rules—which 
often assume a search in ―real space‖ for a tangible document 
or an audible conversation—to the digital world. Because very 
few courts have addressed the application of the Fourth 
Amendment to content searches on third party servers, this 
Part provides a brief summary of the caselaw that has been 
used, by analogy, to Internet searches. 
 
 1. Postal Service Searches 
 
Since the late 1800s, the Supreme Court has applied the 
Fourth Amendment to various forms of communication 
between citizens in different homes. In Ex Parte Jackson, the 
Court applied the Fourth Amendment‘s warrant requirement 
to sealed letters sent through the Postal Service.152 The Court 
held that: 
 
Letters, and sealed packages . . . are as fully 
guarded from examination and inspection, except 
as to their outward form and weight, as if they 
were retained by the parties forwarding them in 
their own domiciles . . . . Whilst in the mail, they 
can only be opened and examined under like 
warrant, issued upon similar oath or affirmation, 
 
151. Commonwealth v. Blood, 507 N.E.2d 1029, 1033 (Mass. 1987). 
152. 96 U.S. 727, 733 (1877). 
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particularly describing the thing to be seized, as 
is required when papers are subjected to search 
in one‘s own household.153 
 
The essence of Justice Field‘s mail privacy rule from Ex 
Parte Jackson remained in place for over a century. A 
congressional statute codified the rule: 
 
No letter of such a class of domestic origin shall 
be opened except under authority of a search 
warrant authorized by law, or by an officer or 
employee of the Postal Service for the sole 
purpose of determining an address at which the 
letter can be delivered, or pursuant to the 
authorization of the addressee.154 
 
However, President George W. Bush amended the rule to allow 
searches ―in exigent circumstances, such as to protect human 
life and safety against hazardous materials, and the need for 
physical searches specifically authorized by law for foreign 
intelligence collection.‖155 Also, this rule does not apply when 
sealed mail originates beyond the borders of the United 
States156 or is sent through Fourth Class mail.157 
 
 2. Telephone Searches and Electronic Surveillance 
Unrelated to Computers 
 
When first faced with the issue in 1928, the Court held 
that wiretapping telephone conversations did not trigger the 
Fourth Amendment.158 In Olmstead v. United States, Chief 
 
153. Id. 
154. 39 U.S.C. § 3623(d) (repealed 2009). 
155. Press Release, George W. Bush, President‘s Statement on H.R. 
6407, the ―Postal Accountability and Enhancement Act,‖ Dec. 20, 2006, 
available at 2006 WL 3737548. 
156. See United States v. Various Articles of Obscene Merchandise, 
Schedule No. 1213, 395 F. Supp. 791 (S.D.N.Y. 1975), aff‟d, 538 F.2d 317 
(1976). 
157. See United States v. Riley, 554 F.2d 1282, 1283 (5th Cir. 1977). 
158. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 464 (1928). 
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Justice Taft‘s majority opinion compared a telephone call with 
an audible conversation between two individuals in an open 
public space.159 In a famous dissent, Justice Brandeis stated 
that telephone users enter a virtual private space, even if the 
wires being tapped are in public space.160 
Today, the law on telephonic wiretapping searches largely 
resembles the law on mail searches, in that private phone calls 
are treated like private packages. In Katz v. United States, the 
Court reversed the rule from Olmstead and analogized the act 
of entering a closed public phone booth to the act of entering a 
private building.161 The Court held that the government‘s 
electronic surveillance and recording of Katz‘s conversation in 
the phone booth violated his ―reasonable expectation of 
privacy,‖ and thus, also infringed upon his Fourth Amendment 
rights.162 Under this rule, a person must exhibit both an ―actual 
(subjective) expectation of privacy‖ and ―the expectation [must] 
be one that society is prepared to recognize as ‗reasonable.‘‖163 
But just as some mail is unprotected, there are also 
limitations to telephonic privacy. In Smith v. Maryland, the 
Court held that the phone number a person dials is not 
protected since that information must be revealed to someone 
at the phone company in order for the call to be made.164 The 
Court reasoned that ―a person has no legitimate expectation of 
privacy in information he voluntarily turns over to third 
parties.‖165 The opinion noted that the numbers obtained by the 
pen register ―do not acquire the ‗contents‘ of communication,‖ 
thereby distinguishing the phone numbers from the 
conversations recorded in Katz.166 
In 1979, the Supreme Court further expanded the use of 
 
159. Id. 
160. Id. at 471 (Brandeis, J., concurring). 
161. 389 U.S. 347, 360 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring). 
162. Id. at 362. Although the ―reasonable expectation of privacy‖ rule 
stems from Justice Harlan‘s concurrence, virtually every court recognizes 
that the genesis of the doctrine originates with Katz. 
163. Id. at 361. 
164. Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 742-43 (1979). 
165. Id. at 743-44. 
166. Id. at 747-48 n.1 (Stewart, J., dissenting). 
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electronic surveillance orders in Dahlia v. United States.167 In 
that case, the Court held that the Fourth Amendment permits 
the government to secretly enter private property to install 
electronic surveillance devices with a warrant or an order 
under electronic surveillance law.168 Dahlia helped pave the 
way for a dramatic uptick in the number of approved electronic 
surveillance orders: whereas only 174 orders were approved in 
1968, there were 461 federal orders and 1,378 state orders 
approved in 2006.169 
 
 3. Bank Record Searches 
 
The Supreme Court‘s 1976 decision in United States v. 
Miller plays a major role in Internet-related searches today, 
despite the fact that the case involved no question of emerging 
technology.170 In Miller, the Court was faced with the question 
of whether a person has privacy rights in the financial records 
that he shares with a private bank. The Court distinguished 
―private papers‖ from ―the business records of the bank,‖ 
concluding that bank records are unprotected since a defendant 
could ―assert neither ownership nor possession‖ over those 
papers.171 The Court reasoned that Miller had no reasonable 
expectation of privacy in those records because he voluntarily 
disclosed them to a third party, his bank.172 In other words, he 
―assumed the risk‖ that the bank may reveal his information to 
the government.173 
 
167. United States v. Miller, 441 U.S. 238 (1979). 
168. Id. 
169. See Electronic Privacy Information Center, Title III Electronic 
Surveillance 1968-1999, EPIC, 
http://www.epic.org/privacy/wiretap/stats/wiretap_stats.html (last visited 
Nov. 15, 2010). 92 percent of the wiretaps in 2006 involved mobile devices. 
James C. Duff, Director, Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts, Report on 
Applications for Orders Authorizing or Approving the Interception of Wire, 
Oral, or Electronic Communications (Apr. 2007), available at 
http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/Statistics/WiretapReports/2006/2006WT.pd
f. 
170. 425 U.S. 435 (1976). 
171. Id. at 440. 
172. Id. at 443. 
173. Id. 
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This ―assumption of risk‖ reasoning from United States v. 
Miller paved the way for Smith v. Maryland and the Third 
Party Doctrine. Together, Miller and Smith establish that 
Internet customers and users do not have reasonable 
expectations of privacy in their transactional records or 
subscriber information. This doctrine will play a major role in 
Internet-related searches, discussed infra. 
 
 4. Computer Hardware Searches 
 
In the United States, ―[i]ndividuals generally possess a 
reasonable expectation of privacy in their home computers.‖174 
Thus, generally speaking, the government can only seize and 
search a person‘s computer with a warrant.175 Some cases have 
upheld broad searches of a person‘s entire computer system,176 
while others have limited the scope to those files sought by the 
warrant.177 Computer searches have also been limited when a 
computer is shared by different users and certain files are 
protected by different passwords.178 However, when a person 
makes his home computer available to his family members and 
his spouse ends up accessing personal information on the hard 
drive and using it against him in court, a court may not 
necessarily protect such accessible data.179 
 
174. See United States v. Lifshitz, 369 F.3d 173, 190 (2d Cir. 2004). 
175. See United States v. Lacy, 119 F.3d 742 (9th Cir. 1997). 
Presumably, some of the warrantless search exceptions such as plain view 
and consent searches can be applied to computer searches. 
176. Id. at 746; see also United States v. Campos, 221 F.3d 1143 (10th 
Cir. 2000). 
177. See United States v. Carey, 173 F.3d 1268 (10th Cir. 1999) 
(excluding the discovery of pornographic files when the warrant was limited 
to searching for records about illegal drug distribution). For an excellent 
article on the difficulty of applying traditional Fourth Amendment doctrine to 
computer searches, see Orin S. Kerr, Searches and Seizures in a Digital 
World, 119 HARV. L. REV. 531, 556 (2005). 
178. See Trulock v. Freeh, 275 F.3d 391, 403 (4th Cir. 2001) (concluding 
that one person‘s consent to search did not extend to a search of another 
user‘s files on the same computer when that person did not know the other‘s 
password). 
179. White v. White, 781 A.2d 85 (N.J. Super Ct. Ch. Div. 2001) (holding 
there was no objective, reasonable expectation of privacy in e-mails stored on 
family computer‘s hard drive) 
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Over the last five years, government searches of a home 
computer have also raised new questions because of the 
possibility that a person‘s files, stored on a computer at home, 
can be searched through peer-to-peer networks. Thus far, the 
Eighth, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits—the only circuits that have 
confronted this issue—have all ruled that defendants lack a 
reasonable expectation of privacy in files that are freely shared 
with others.180 
For example, in United States v. Stults, the defendant had 
child pornography files on his home computer but unknowingly 
shared them through his peer-to-peer file-sharing software.181 
As a result, the federal government was able to search and 
duplicate the files.182 Even if defendant was unaware that 
others could access those files, the Eighth Circuit nonetheless 
held that he lacked a reasonable expectation of privacy in any 
shared files.183 
These cases were easy to decide, in my view, because the 
incriminating files were in plain view. From the perspective of 
an outsider using a file-sharing program, the defendants in 
those cases did nothing to password-protect, conceal, or block 
complete strangers from accessing files. Although some of the 
defendants claimed to be unaware that incriminating content 
was being shared, that explanation is no different than saying, 
―I was unaware that the curtains in my house were open and 
that others could see my crystal meth lab.‖ People who share 
files on a peer-to-peer network are aware that complete 
strangers can duplicate their files; as such, they cannot argue 
they expected to somehow distinguish between the police and 
private individuals. 
 
 
180. United States v. Borowy, 2010 WL 537501, at *3 (9th Cir. Feb. 17, 
2010); United States v. Stults, 575 F.3d 834, 843 (8th Cir. 2009), cert. denied, 
130 S. Ct. 1309 (2010); United States v. Barrows, 481 F.3d 1246, 1249 (10th 
Cir. 2007) (holding that a city employee did not have a reasonable expectation 
of privacy in his personal computer that he brought to work and hooked up to 
the city‘s network for file sharing, kept continuously on, and failed to 
password protect). 
181. Stults, 575 F.3d at 834. 
182. Id. 
183. Id. 
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 5. Searches of Digital Content Stored on Third Party 
Servers 
 
This category squarely addresses the technological search 
discussed by this Article: government searches of information 
that users store, send, or receive through the Internet. Unlike 
the previous category, the information obtained is not literally 
found on a person‘s home computer, but rather, on a server, 
outside the home, hosted by a third party. 
When an electronic communication stored on another 
server is readily viewable to the public, courts have had no 
difficulty applying the ―plain view‖ rule to such content. For 
example, courts have refused to find a reasonable expectation 
of privacy with regard to content on websites open to the 
public.184 In United States v. Gines-Perez, a district court 
refused to exclude a picture of a store‘s employees that a 
government agent downloaded from a store‘s website.185 
Another relatively settled rule in this area is that courts 
have extended the Miller and Smith Third Party Doctrine rules 
to network accounts and other non-content information 
obtained from Internet service providers (ISP). As the Tenth 
Circuit observed, ―[e]very federal court to address this issue 
has held that subscriber information provided to an Internet 
provider is not protected by the Fourth Amendment‘s privacy 
expectation.‖186 For example, in Guest v. Leis, the Sixth Circuit 
 
184. See Pharmatrak, Inc. Privacy Litigation, 220 F. Supp. 2d 4, 27 (D. 
Mass. 2002), rev‟d, 329 F.3d 9 (1st Cir. 2003); U.S. v. Gines-Perez, 214 F. 
Supp. 2d 205 (D.P.R. 2002); J.S. ex rel. H.S. v. Bethlehem Area Sch. Dist., 757 
A.2d 412 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2000), aff‟d, 569 Pa. 638 (2002) (holding that a 
minor did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy as to content on his 
website). 
185. Gines-Perez, 214 F. Supp. 2d at 225. 
186. United States v. Perrine, 518 F.3d 1196, 1204 (10th Cir. 2008); see 
also United States v. Forrester, 495 F.3d 1041 (9th Cir. 2007), amended on 
other grounds by 512 F.3d 500 (9th Cir. 2008) (holding that e-mail and 
Internet users have no reasonable expectation of privacy in source or 
destination addresses of e-mail or the IP addresses of websites visited); Guest 
v. Leis, 255 F.3d 325, 336 (6th Cir. 2001) (refusing to protect network account 
holders‘ subscriber information from communication service provider); United 
States v. Hambrick, 225 F.3d 656 (4th Cir. 2000) (unpublished opinion); 
United States v. Kennedy, 81 F. Supp. 23 1103 (D. Kan. 2000); Hause v. 
Com., 83 S.W.3d 1 (Ky. Ct. App. 2001); United States v. Cox, 190 F. Supp. 2d 
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held that the Fourth Amendment did not protect ISP 
customers‘ subscriber information because they were 
voluntarily communicated with ―systems operators.‖187 These 
conclusions are largely consistent with the telephone and mail 
rules, to the extent that one can analogize a customer‘s 
subscriber information with the phone number provided to a 
telephone operator or the address in plain view of the postal 
service; none of these examples involve government searches of 
―conversations‖ or other content-rich information. 
In essence, if a person does nothing to manifest an 
intention to keep electronic content private, then there is no 
reasonable expectation of privacy. Courts have reached 
different conclusions, however, when a person does take some 
active steps to keep content private. 
While there is hardly enough caselaw to identify a general 
trend, most courts facing this question refused to protect ―non-
content,‖ applying similar principles from caselaw involving 
postal mail and telephone calls. 
For example, in United States v. Forrester, the Ninth 
Circuit held that a pen register that monitored a criminal 
defendant‘s Internet usage did not constitute a search.188 When 
PacBell installed a ―mirror port,‖ the government was able to 
learn ―the to/from addresses of Alba‘s e-mail messages, the IP 
addresses of the websites that Alba visited and the total 
volume of information sent to or from his account.‖189 Despite 
the advanced technology involved, the court held that the 
surveillance was ―conceptually indistinguishable from 
government surveillance of physical mail‖ and telephone 
calls.190 
In contrast, a New Jersey state court, interpreting the 
state constitution, held that a defendant had a reasonable 
expectation of privacy in her ISP account information because 
 
330 (N.D.N.Y. 2002). 
187. Guest, 255 F.3d at 336; see also Kennedy, 81 F. Supp. 2d at 1110; 
Hambrick, 55 F. Supp. 2d at 508 (holding that ISP records were not protected 
since the defendant knowingly revealed his name, address, credit card 
number, and telephone number to Mindspring and its employees). 
188. United States v. Forrester, 495 F.3d 1041, 1048 (9th Cir. 2007). 
189. Id. at 1044. 
190. Forrester, 495 F.3d at 1041. 
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her use of an anonymous ISP ―screen name‖ manifested her 
intention to keep her identity anonymous.191 Similarly, the 
First Circuit affirmed a Rhode Island district court decision 
that held that the government‘s right to access a public library 
computer network did not extend to the right to access a city 
official‘s private Yahoo! e-mail user‘s account that was accessed 
on that network.192 
However, even where courts have found a reasonable 
expectation of privacy in digital content stored on third party 
servers, the government has still been able to compel the 
production of content by way of a subpoena.193 The Supreme 
Court has previously held that the Fourth Amendment is not 
violated by a subpoena that is ―sufficiently limited in scope, 
relevant in purpose, and specific in directive so that compliance 
will not be unreasonably burdensome.‖194 Moreover, the Fourth 
Amendment does not require that the targets of an 
investigation in third-party subpoena cases be notified.195 
The fact that the third party may not ―own‖ the requested 
content is irrelevant; so long as the entity has ―access‖ or 
―control‖ to the content, the government may compel 
disclosure.196 Because most network service providers include 
terms of service that state that the providers have authority to 
access and disclose a subscriber‘s content, courts have had no 
difficulty concluding that the providers had ―access‖ or 
―control‖ to the content.197 
But unlike the rules on inspecting ―content‖ in mail and 
 
191. State v. Reid, 914 A.2d 310, 317 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2007). 
192. Wilson v. Moreau, 440 F. Supp. 2d 81, 108 (D.R.I. 2006). The court 
did not conclude, however, that all Yahoo! e-mail users have a reasonable 
expectation of privacy in their e-mails. 
193. See, e.g., United States v. Palmer, 536 F.2d 1278, 1281-82 (9th Cir. 
1976). 
194. Donovan v. Lone Steer, Inc., 464 U.S. 408, 414-15 (1984) (quoting 
See, 387 U.S. at 544). 
195. See SEC v. Jerry T. O‘Brien, Inc., 467 U.S. 735, 743, 749-51 (1984). 
196. See United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 171 n.7 (1974); see also 
United States v. Barr, 605 F. Supp. 114, 119 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (allowing 
disclosure of a defendant‘s mail that was in the possession of a third party‘s 
mail service). 
197. See Warshak v. United States, 532 F.3d 521, 527 (6th Cir. 2008) (en 
banc). 
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telephone calls, most courts have not extended similar Fourth 
Amendment privacy rights to people who create, send, or 
receive content on third party servers. While the law in this 
area is still in its infancy, the Third Party Doctrine has played 
a major role when courts explain why a person does not have a 
reasonable expectation of privacy in content stored on the 
Internet.198 
First, in the employment context, the Supreme Court 
recently held that employees that communicate through 
employer-provided network servers or on employer-supplied 
technologies do not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in 
their communications.199 The Court‘s ruling reflects the fairly 
large consensus among the lower courts.200 Even when an 
employee has taken measures to shield messages sent over his 
work e-mail by placing them in a ―personal folder,‖ the fact that 
these messages travel through the employer‘s network—
subjecting them to third party access—strip them of any 
Fourth Amendment protections.201 
Courts have similarly refused to protect chat room 
communications, bulletin boards, and e-mails forwarded to 
―lists‖ created from all chat room members. In Guest v. Leis, 
the Sixth Circuit held that a disclaimer on a private bulletin 
board service defeated any expectation of privacy in postings.202 
In United States v. Charbonneau, a district court held that, 
while a person can reasonably expect that an e-mail, like a 
letter, will not be intercepted prior to reaching the recipient 
without a warrant, once the recipient receives that e-mail, any 
privacy expectation is greatly diminished.203 The court noted 
that the sender cannot control the fate of a message once it is 
received, whether by a recipient that intends to share the 
 
198. I am using the phrase ―on the Internet‖ as a short-hand way of 
saying ―on servers hosted by Internet service providers and other third 
parties that hold content belonging to an individual.‖ 
199. See City of Ontario v. Quon, 130 S. Ct. 2619 (2010). 
200. Smyth v. Pillsbury Co., 914 F. Supp. 97 (E.D. Pa. 1996); McLaren v. 
Microsoft Corp., No. 05-97-00824-CV, 1999 WL 339015, at *1 (Tex. Ct. App. 
May 28, 1999). 
201. McLaren, 1999 WL 339015 at *4. 
202. Guest, 255 F.3d at 333. 
203. United States v. Charbonneau, 979 F. Supp. 1177, 1184 (S.D. Ohio 
1997). 
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content, or by an undercover agent.204 
Thus, courts have fixated on this architectural difference 
between telephone conversations (during which people do not 
expect to be taped) and Internet communications (where 
messages are ―recorded‖ and can be easily forwarded).205 
Unlike a telephone conversation, during which the persons 
communicating would have no reason to believe that the 
content of their communications were being taped or recorded, 
users of the Internet are aware that their communications and 
messages are being conducted in a recorded format.206 
Indeed, thus far, only two military courts have found a 
reasonable expectation of privacy, under the Fourth 
Amendment, in stored e-mail messages.207 No other courts 
reached a similar result. 
The reason that the caselaw is so thin is that most courts 
have been able to avoid these questions because of federal 
statutes that extend privacy rights beyond those guaranteed by 
the Fourth Amendment. 
 
F. Application to Facebook 
 
 1. Information in Plain View 
 
Facebook users who make their profile ―public‖ have no 
reasonable expectation of privacy since any evidence obtained 
from the site is clearly in ―plain view.‖ The Fourth 
Amendment‘s warrant requirement will not apply when a 
government investigator can freely view a website without any 
 
204. Id. at 1184-85. 
205. Com v. Proetto, 771 A.2d 823 (Pa. 2001), appeal granted in part, 
790 A.2d 988 (Pa. 2002) and order aff‟d, 837 A.2d 1163 (2003) (holding there 
was no reasonable expectation of privacy in e-mail messages sent by man to a 
fifteen-year-old girl where e-mail communications, including two 
photographs, were sent to the girl after the two chatted in an online chat 
room). 
206. Id. 
207. See United States v. Long, 64 M.J. 57, 66-67 (C.A.A.F. 2006); 
United States v. Maxwell, 45 M.J. 406, 418 (C.A.A.F. 1996) (concluding that 
the accused had a reasonable expectation of privacy in e-mail files stored by 
AOL). 
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special passwords or encryption tools. 
Granted, a person‘s Facebook page may not be in plain 
view in the same way as, say, marijuana plants in a person‘s 
backyard.208 Unlike the crops, it is unlikely that an officer 
might see a person‘s Facebook page through a routine patrol. 
However, the website is something the police can see with the 
naked eye without resorting to mechanical devices ―not in 
general public use.‖209 
Facebook users who mask or alter their true identities—by 
using nom de plumes or fake profile photos, for example—still 
lack a reasonable expectation of privacy if the public can 
nonetheless view their content. The intent to mask identity is 
not the same as the intent to keep the incriminating evidence 
private. Any information obtained would be in ―plain view‖ and 
could, among other things, provide the probable cause 
necessary to obtain a warrant to learn the user‘s true identity. 
Indeed, a handful of friends and former students, when 
transitioning into a professional career or looking for jobs, have 
invited me, again, to their second Facebook account.210 Most 
claim that the privacy policies are not effective enough to 
ensure that their new ―professional‖ self will clearly exclude 
incriminating photos and the friends likely to post 
inappropriate content. Indeed, Norton‘s 2010 Cybercrime 
report revealed that one-third of seven thousand adults in 
fourteen countries have ―used a fake online identity.‖211 
Meanwhile, no caselaw suggests that evidence in plain view of 
a police officer should be excluded because the officer did not 
 
208. See California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207 (1986) (holding that the 
marijuana, which was viewable by any person who flew above the airspace, 
fell within the plain view doctrine). 
209. Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27 (2001) (holding that the use of a 
thermal imager to detect infrared radiation inside a person‘s home was a 
search). 
210. This does clearly violate Facebook‘s policies. Facebook insists that 
each individual have one account and use the privacy options to differentiate 
between, for example, employees, friends, and family. 
211. Marian Merritt, Norton‟s Cybercrime Report: The Human Impact 
Reveals Global Cybercrime Epidemic and Our Hidden Hypocrisy, NORTON 
COMMUNITY (Sept. 8, 2010), http://community.norton.com/t5/Ask-
Marian/Norton-s-Cybercrime-Report-The-Human-Impact-Reveals-Global/ba-
p/282432. 
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know the true identity of the perpetrator. 
 
2. Information Forwarded to the Government by a 
Facebook ―Friend‖ 
 
Any information that a private Facebook user‘s ―friend‖ 
willingly gives to a government official will not be excluded 
since private searches do not trigger the Fourth Amendment. 
For example, suppose a mother sees on her teenager daughter‘s 
computer monitor that some of her Facebook friends are 
running a counterfeit stamp operation and reveals this 
information to the police. Even if the counterfeiters set their 
profiles to be viewable only by a limited set of friends, and even 
if they never imagined that someone‘s mother would see the 
page, no government search has taken place. 
However, it does not follow that a Facebook user lacks 
reasonable expectation of privacy simply because another 
―private‖ person could pass on the content to a police officer. 
After all, the person to whom Katz was speaking could have 
repeated the content of the conversation to the police. 
One gray area involves situations where private 
individuals provide police with evidence or information of 
illegal activity on Facebook, but then the police ask her 
cooperation to broaden the search. Suppose Bernardo, who is 
Facebook friends with Tony, tells Officer Krupke that he saw 
photos on Facebook of Tony trespassing on private property. 
Officer Krupke then asks Bernardo to come into the station 
and show him the photos. But after Bernardo logs into his 
Facebook account and hands Officer Krupke his laptop, the 
officer begins to snoop for additional evidence or additional 
crimes. 
Such a search might conflict with existing caselaw 
regarding searches in physical spaces where the police go 
beyond the allowed physical scope of the search. For example, 
in Thompson v. Louisiana, the Supreme Court held that a 
daughter‘s summoning police to her mother‘s home to render 
medical assistance did not constitute an open-ended invitation 
for the police to conduct a general search for evidence of 
54http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol31/iss1/7
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homicide.212 
Such a search may also run afoul of cases restricting third 
persons, in certain contexts, to consent to searches of jointly 
owned property. As a general rule, a third party who shares 
common authority over property can consent to a search and 
waive the Fourth Amendment rights of the other.213 However, 
the consent may evaporate when the third party is no longer 
present.214 For example, the First Circuit suppressed an audio 
recording after an undercover agent rented a hotel room for a 
defendant and planted recording devices.215 Even though the 
government claimed that it did not record when the consenting 
undercover agent was absent, the court held that ―when one‘s 
confidante leaves his premises, he is left with an expectation of 
privacy in his surroundings which is not only actual but 
justifiable.‖216 Similarly, the district court in United States v. 
Shabazz held that a defendant‘s companion‘s consent to wire a 
rented hotel room for audio and video recording, even when the 
companion was not in the room, was ―so massive and 
unregulated as to require the suppression of its product.‖217 
No court has had occasion to apply these principles from 
consent search cases to searches of cyberspace. Nonetheless, I 
see no reason why the above limitations on consent searches 
should not apply to protected areas on the World Wide Web. If 
lines of consent can be drawn in physical space, there is no 
reason why similar lines cannot be drawn in cyberspace or, 
specifically, in all the various corners of Facebook. Returning to 
my hypothetical, if Bernardo shows the Facebook photos of 
 
212. 469 U.S. 17, 22 (1984); see also United States v. Dichiarinte, 445 
F.2d 126, 129 (7th Cir. 1971) (holding that consent to search a house for 
narcotics did not extend to the search of private papers in the home). 
213. United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 170 (1974) (girlfriend who 
shared defendant‘s bedroom could consent to search); Frazier v. Cupp, 394 
U.S. 731, 740 (1969) (one of two cousins who shared use of a duffel bag could 
consent to search). See Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177, 177 (1990) (holding 
that even when the third party doesn‘t have actual authority, the search is 
still valid if the officer reasonably believed that the consenting party had 
authority). 
214. United States v. Padilla, 520 F.2d 526, 527 (1st Cir. 1975). 
215. Id. 
216. Id. (citing Katz, 389 U.S. at 359-61). 
217. 883 F. Supp. 422, 424 (D. Minn. 1995). 
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Tony‘s criminal trespass to Officer Krupke, but Officer Krupke 
commandeers Bernando‘s laptop and keeps digging further, 
this would no longer fit into the ―plain view‖ or ―consent 
search‖ exception. Similarly, if Bernardo only consents to 
Officer Krupke looking through a Facebook photo album called 
―Men on Maria‘s Balcony,‖ such consent would not extend to a 
different photo album called ―Knife-Fighting with the Sharks.‖ 
Finally, if Bernardo gave Officer Krupke his Facebook account 
password to use whenever he wanted, such boundless search 
capabilities should be similarly suppressed. 
 
 3. Information Unknowingly Provided to Government 
Agents 
 
The practice of government officials creating fake online 
identities to gain access to others‘ Facebook profiles raises an 
oft-debated issue: do people have a reasonable expectation that 
our friends aren‘t government agents in disguise? 
The Misplaced Trust Doctrine suggests that the answer is 
always a simple ―no.‖ In other words, if a Facebook user 
voluntarily communicates incriminating information to 
―friends‖ who are actually moles, narcs, and spies, she has no 
reasonable expectation of privacy in that information. 
However, the myriad ways in which government agents 
might obtain information through ―disguise‖ on Facebook 
present different levels of privacy expectations and suggest 
varying outcomes. To illustrate, here are eight ways that a 
criminal defendant might unknowingly provide content to the 
government: 
 
1. Defendant‘s (D) Facebook page is open to the 
public. 
 
2. D becomes friends with Steven Pearl (SP), 
whom D knows to be a police officer. 
 
3. D becomes friends with SP, whom D knows, 
but does not realize is a police officer. 
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4. D does not know SP, but accepts his friendship 
request because they have other mutual friends 
in common. 
 
5. D does not know SP, but accepts his friendship 
because SP purports to be a former classmate or 
work colleague. 
 
6. D accepts a friendship request from ―SP,‖ his 
high school best friend. However, D does not 
realize that ―SP‖ is actually Attorney General 
Eric Holder, who used SP‘s photo and 
biographical data to create a fake Facebook 
account under SP‘s identity, for the purpose of 
gaining access to D‘s information. 
 
7. D and SP are good friends. The government 
hacks into SP‘s account to view D‘s information. 
 
8. After becoming Facebook friends with D 
through scenarios #3, 4, 5, 6, or 7 above, SP uses 
Facebook to actively cajole D into committing a 
crime. 
 
This list is intentionally ordered to begin with examples of 
passive surveillance and move toward more facilitative 
operations, which require active involvement and deception by 
the police.218 
Scenario 1 is clearly ―in plain view,‖ discussed above, and 
would pose no privacy issues, regardless of whether D was 
aware that his page was open to the public. Scenario 2 is an 
even more egregious illustration of someone voluntarily 
trampling on his privacy expectations. 
Scenarios 3 and 4 parallel the futile ―I didn‘t realize that 
one of the participants in our fight club is actually a police 
 
218. For an excellent and more thorough discussion of various 
surveillance methods, see Elizabeth E. Joh, Breaking the Law to Enforce It: 
Undercover Police Participation in Crime‖ 62 STAN. L. REV. 155, 163 (2009). 
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officer‖ line of arguments soundly rejected by most courts. As 
previously discussed, if a person in ―real space‖ conversed with 
or in front of an undercover agent, courts denied Fourth 
Amendment protection, reasoning that she should have been 
more careful about the people with whom she surrounded 
herself if she expected privacy from government surveillance. 
In scenario 4, the fact that the undercover officer previously 
tricked D‘s friends is of no import. Indeed, in real space, 
undercover officers typically earn the trust of D‘s friends in 
order to earn D‘s trust. The privacy considerations do not 
change just because such undercover policing will 
disproportionately affect those who place too much trust in 
their friends (―if you‘re a friend of Mike, you‘re a friend of 
mine‖) or those who regularly accept the friendship requests of 
random strangers to bolster a façade of popularity. 
Scenarios 5, 6, and 7 are more problematic because they 
involve more active levels of fraud and deceit. For example, if 
defendant receives a request from a person claiming to be his 
good friend ―Steven J. Pearl‖ (whom he knows is not a 
government agent) and Mr. Pearl‘s profile includes specific 
information (e.g., his photo or biographical data) that allows 
him to verify that he has the right Steven J. Pearl, he has a 
reasonable expectation that he is not communicating with a 
government official. However, as discussed above, courts have 
been steadfast in refusing to exclude information obtained from 
undercover agents. 
Moreover, because the Internet naturally invites a healthy 
skepticism with regard to others‘ true identity, courts will be 
especially unlikely to protect information obtained through 
undercover policing. Indeed, on Facebook, you never know 
whether a friendship request from ―Jenny Taylor‖ is from the 
woman you met at last night‘s party, or from your fraternity 
brothers who are hoping to play a cruel joke on you. Even 
though identity theft or hacking is a crime, most courts have 
nonetheless upheld police tactics that involve violating rules in 
order to enforce them. 
Under existing law, the only scenario that might pose 
problems under current law is 8. But there, the issue is one of 
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entrapment, which provides a potential defense to the crime, 
and not grounds to exclude evidence.219 
Interestingly, the misplaced trust doctrine only seems to 
run in one direction. If a user‘s ―friend‖ turns out to be an 
undercover agent who violated Facebook‘s policies to create a 
fake account, the user has no privacy protections. However, the 
misplaced trust in the identity or accuracy of any evidence on 
Facebook has yet to lead to the successful suppression of such 
evidence. 
 
 4. Information Voluntarily Disclosed by Facebook 
 
If Facebook or its employees were to voluntarily provide a 
user‘s personal information to government investigators, the 
Fourth Amendment would not clearly prevent or exclude such 
evidence under the Voluntary Disclosure Doctrine. 
If Facebook‘s privacy policy clearly stated that it would not 
disclose information to government investigators unless it 
received a warrant or subpoena, perhaps users might be able to 
present a different argument. 
But as discussed in Part I of this Article, Facebook‘s 
privacy policy as of April 22, 2010 states that: 
 
We may disclose information pursuant to 
subpoenas, court orders, or other requests 
(including criminal and civil matters) if we have 
a good faith belief that the response is required 
by law. This may include respecting requests 
from jurisdictions outside of the United States 
where we have a good faith belief that the 
response is required by law under the local laws 
in that jurisdiction, apply to users from that 
jurisdiction, and are consistent with generally 
accepted international standards. We may also 
share information when we have a good faith 
belief it is necessary to prevent fraud or other 
 
219. For a discussion of how most instances of police surveillance do not 
constitute entrapment, see Jerome H. Skolnick, Deception by Police, 1 CRIM. 
JUST. ETHICS (1982). 
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illegal activity, to prevent imminent bodily harm, 
or to protect ourselves and you from people 
violating our Statement of Rights and 
Responsibilities. This may include sharing 
information with other companies, lawyers, 
courts or other government entities.220 
 
The policy clearly states that Facebook will comply with mere 
―requests,‖ suggesting a standard far lower than reasonable 
suspicion. The ―required by law‖ part of the first sentence 
might be interpreted to mean that it will deny any ―requests‖ 
unless it will face obstruction charges, contempt fines, or other 
consequences as a result of denying the requests. However, the 
remainder of the policy makes clear that Facebook reserves the 
right to hand over any content that might be ―necessary to 
prevent . . . illegal activity.‖ 
 
5. Information Obtained by the Government through 
Warrants, Subpoenas, or Improper Means 
 
If the Third Party Doctrine is literally applied to all 
communications on the Internet, Facebook users will struggle 
to persuade a court that any expectations of privacy are 
reasonable, even when employing the most restrictive privacy 
settings. When users interact with Facebook, they should know 
that an employee of Facebook may view or do something with 
that information. Moreover, Facebook‘s privacy policies notify 
Facebook users that their content may be shared with 
Facebook‘s commercial partners; any targeted advertising 
serves as regular reminders of this fact. Thus, users are on 
notice that their content can be shared by multiple third 
parties without any notification. 
Most courts would conclude that the reasonableness of a 
Facebook user‘s expectation of privacy incrementally 
diminishes with each additional ―friend‖ who can access the 
content. Such a rule poses serious problems because content 
shared via Facebook is less likely to be viewed by only a small, 
 
220. Facebook Privacy Policy, supra note 26. 
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trusted group of friends, relative to content sent through e-
mail. Given the primary purpose of social networking, I would 
guess that most Facebook users‘ pictures, status updates, and 
feeds can be accessed by their entire circle of ―friends,‖ which 
often include people who might better be described as 
acquaintances, former classmates, and complete strangers with 
similar interests or romantic potential.221 In contrast, most 
people do not send e-mails to their entire address book222 
unless announcing new contact information or forwarding 
messages about a cash reward from Bill Gates for testing 
Microsoft‘s e-mail tracking system.223 Which is to say, the very 
purpose of Facebook runs at odds with this privacy rule. 
If, then, the current law supports the warrantless and 
subpoena-less search of a user‘s private Facebook account, this 
is likely to be at great odds with what most people today would 
generally consider to be private. When Christopher Slobogin 
and Joseph Schumacher conducted a survey of individuals to 
rate the intrusiveness of certain types of searches or seizures 
on a scale of 0 (nonintrusive) to 100 (extremely intrusiveness), 
the monitoring of a phone for thirty days rated at a whoppingly 
high 87.67, only a few points short of the highest-rated search, 
a body cavity search at the border, which earned a 90.14 
rating.224 
 
 
221. I am only reaching this conclusion anecdotally and through my own 
experiences. As discussed above, I am aware that Facebook allows for 
different types of communications such as e-mail and chatting, which are 
intended to reach a much smaller subset of individuals. Moreover, I am 
aware that if a user were to upload a picture or write a rant on her wall, she 
could also limit which of her friends can see that information. However, I 
imagine that most users, like myself, do not use Facebook to share 
information with only a small fraction of their ―friends.‖ 
222. Initially, I considered using the word ―Rolodex‖ here instead of 
―address book.‖ However, out of sensitivity to those born in the last quarter 
century, I have refrained from using such dated terms. 
223. See Microsoft/AOL Giveaway, SNOPES.COM, 
http://www.snopes.com/inboxer/nothing/microsoft-aol.asp (last visited Nov. 
11, 2010). 
224. See Christopher Slobogin & Joseph E. Schumacher, Reasonable 
Expectations of Privacy and Autonomy in Fourth Amendment Cases: An 
Empirical Look at “Understandings Recognized and Permitted by Society,” 42 
Duke L.J. 727, 737 (1993). 
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V. Facebook Privacy under Federal Statutory Privacy Laws 
 
In addition to the restrictions of the Fourth Amendment, 
federal electronic surveillance law in the United States is also 
governed by the Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 
1986 (ECPA),225 which was, at the time, a forward-looking 
congressional statute that amended the Wiretap Act of 1968 
and specified new privacy standards for emerging and 
dramatically advancing technologies.226 Unfortunately, 
Congress has not significantly revised the statute since 1986, a 
time when Facebook CEO Mark Zuckerberg‘s concept of 
posting on walls involved fewer servers and more crayons.227 
More specifically, Congress sought to restrict unauthorized 
surveillance of electronic communications and use ECPA to fill 
in gaps left by the existing constitutional and statutory 
framework at that time.228 In 1986, existing Fourth 
Amendment doctrine did not protect e-mail and other electronic 
communications.229 This remains largely true today. 
 
225. 18 U.S.C. § 2511(1) (2000). 
226. S. REP. NO. 99-541, at 1 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 
3555, 3555. A report by the Office of Technology Assessment suggests that, in 
1986, electronic surveillance was no longer limited to telephone taps and 
concealed microphones, but also included ―miniaturized transmitters for 
audio surveillance, lightweight compact television cameras for video 
surveillance, improved night vision cameras and viewing devices, and a 
rapidly growing array of computer-based surveillance techniques.‖ OFFICE OF 
TECH. ASSESSMENT, FEDERAL GOVERNMENT INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY: 
ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE AND CIVIL LIBERTIES 9 (1986). The report also 
noted that those with enough money, tech savvy, and determination could 
monitor electronic communications sent via wire, coaxial cable, microwave, 
satellite, and fiber optics. Id. Although encryption prevented such electronic 
surveillance, such technologies were too expensive and cumbersome for 
widespread usage in 1986. Id. 
227. Mark Zuckerberg was born in 1984. 
228. S. REP. NO. 99-541, at 3 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 
3555, 3557. 
229. See Zwillinger & Genetski, supra note 139, at 574 (―[The law 
governing subpoenas of electronic communication] was conceived at a time 
that pre-dated the World Wide Web, and therefore did not contemplate the 
ubiquitous use of web-based communications services such as Hotmail, 
Yahoo!, MySpace, or Gmail, and the accompanying copious, long-term storage 
offered by such providers.‖). Moreover, as discussed above, the Court‘s 
current Fourth Amendment doctrine still does not clearly protect electronic 
communications that are handled by third-party ISPs. 
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Thus, the ECPA provides protections that go beyond 
traditional Fourth Amendment rules. Most notably, under the 
ECPA, a private ISP cannot invoke the voluntary disclosure 
doctrine, the private search and seizure doctrine, or the 
misplaced trust doctrine to protect it from liability. However, 
the ECPA was also written to allow law enforcement, in limited 
circumstances, to compel disclosure of electronic 
communications by meeting various procedural safeguards.230 
The ECPA divides up communications into three 
categories—(1) wire communications, (2) oral communications, 
and (3) electronic communications—and protects each of them 
differently. These categories could be covered by more than the 
three distinct parts of the ECPA that provide possible 
application to searches on Facebook and on the Internet 
generally: (1) the Wiretap Act, (2) the Stored Communications 
Act (SCA),231 and (3) the Pen Register Act. These are discussed, 
in turn, below. 
 
A. The Wiretap Act 
 
The federal Wiretap Act, first passed as Title III of the 
Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, covers 
wire communications.232 While it originally only covered wire 
and oral communications, the ECPA amended it to also cover 
electronic communications. For those who did not religiously 
watch The Wire, the Wiretap Act broadly prohibits wiretaps,233 
but allows law enforcement to ―intercept‖ communications for 
up to thirty days (1) upon demonstrating probable cause to 
believe that the interception will reveal evidence of specific 
felony offenses, (2) when authorized by the Justice 
Department, and (3) signed by a federal judge.234 
 
230. See S. REP. NO. 99-541, at 5 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 
3555, 3559. 
231. Id., reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3555. 
232. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2522. While this statute is sometimes referred to 
as Title III, I am referring to is as the Wiretap Act since that is the more 
descriptive and unique name and, besides, I am reserving ―Title III‖ as the 
first name for my next child. 
233. Id. § 2511(1). 
234. Id. §§ 2516-18. 
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Section 2501(1) of the ECPA defines a ―wire 
communication‖ as an ―aural transfer‖ that travels through 
wires or similar mediums. These wire communications 
generally receive the most protection. Under § 2510(2), an ―oral 
communication‖ is a communication ―uttered by a person 
exhibiting an expectation such communication is not subject to 
interception under circumstances justifying such expectation.‖ 
But if Facebook communications are covered by this 
statute, they will fall into the third ―electronic communication‖ 
category. The ECPA defines this as ―any transfer of signs, 
signals, writing, images, sounds, data, or intelligence of any 
nature transmitted in whole or in part by a wire, radio, 
electromagnetic, photoelectronic or photooptical system that 
affects interstate or foreign commerce,‖ that isn‘t a wire or oral 
communication.235 
Congress intended ―electronic communication‖ to function 
as a catch-all category.236 The legislative history reveals that it 
was intended to include those communications ―neither carried 
by sound waves nor . . . characterized as one containing the 
human voice (carried in part by wire).‖237 Thus, almost all 
Facebook communications would qualify as electronic 
communications.238 
Undoubtedly, the Wiretap Act provides strong protections 
for virtually all electronic eavesdropping and requires any 
exceptions comply with standards even tougher than what the 
Fourth Amendment requires. 
However, the Wiretap Act has questionable applicability to 
most communications on Facebook because it only covers 
interceptions of electronic communications. Section 2510(4) 
defines ―intercept‖ as ―the aural or other acquisition of the 
contents of any contents of any wire, electronic, or oral 
 
235. Id. § 2510 (12). 
236. See United States v. Herring, 993 F.2d 784, 787 (11th Cir. 1993). 
237. H.R. Rep. No. 99-647, at 35 (1986). 
238. See, e.g., Konop v. Hawaiian Airlines, Inc., 302 F.3d 868, 876 (9th 
Cir. 2002) (electronic communication includes a digital document file 
transmitted from a web server); In re Application of United States, 416 F. 
Supp. 2d 13, 16 (D.D.C. 2006) (holding that electronic communication ―is 
broad enough to encompass email communications and other similar signals 
transmitted over the Internet‖). 
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communication through the use of any electronic, mechanical, 
or other device.‖239 While the statute does not require that the 
communications are intercepted contemporaneously with their 
transmission, the design of the SCA, discussed infra, suggests 
that the Wiretap Act includes such a contemporaneous 
requirement to avoid simultaneous coverage by two different 
statutes with different procedures. Moreover, when the ECPA 
was passed, the concept of ―wiretaps‖ was largely limited to the 
eavesdropping of a live two-way exchange between two parties. 
Most courts that faced this issue have held that the 
Wiretap Act‘s coverage of ―interceptions‖ is limited to when the 
government acquires electronic communications 
contemporaneously with their transmission.240 
However, refusing to follow its sister circuits,241 the First 
Circuit interpreted the Wiretap Act in such a way that it may 
have broader applicability to Facebook communications. In 
United States v. Councilman, the court stated that the 
contemporaneity requirement ―may not be apt to address 
issues involving the application of the Wiretap Act to electronic 
communications.‖242 Specifically, it held that e-mail messages 
are ―intercepted‖ when acquired while in ―transient electronic 
storage that is intrinsic to the communication process.‖243 Thus, 
in the First Circuit, an electronic communication could be in 
 
239. 18 U.S.C. § 2510(4) (2006). 
240. See, e.g., Fraser v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 352 F.3d 107, 113 (3rd 
Cir. 2003) (holding that the Wiretap Act did not cover access to stored e-mail 
communications); United States v. Steiger, 318 F.3d 1039, 1047-50 (11th Cir. 
2003) (files stored on hard drive); Konop, 302 F.3d at 876-79 (website); Steve 
Jackson Games, Inc. v. United States Secret Service, 36 F.3d 457, 460-63 (5th 
Cir. 1994) (stored e-mail communications); United States v. Mercado-Nava, 
486 F. Supp. 2d 1271, 1279 (D. Kan. 2007) (numbers stored in cell phone); 
United States v. Jones, 451 F. Supp. 2d 71, 75 (D.D.C. 2006) (text messages); 
United States v. Reyes, 922 F. Supp. 818, 836-37 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (pager 
communications); Bohach v. City of Reno, 932 F. Supp. 1232, 1235-36 (D. 
Nev. 1996) (same). 
241. I have not been able to confirm whether the other federal circuit 
courts of appeal are sister circuits or brother circuits due to various privacy 
laws protecting medical records. 
242. United States v. Councilman, 418 F.3d 67, 79-80 (1st Cir. 2005) (en 
banc) (citing In re Pharmatrak, Inc. Privacy Litigation, 329 F.3d 9, 21 (1st 
Cir. 2003)). 
243. Id. at 85. 
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―electronic storage‖ while also being in transmission,244 so long 
as the acquisition is not ―made a substantial amount of time 
after material was put into electronic storage.‖245 
Notwithstanding the First Circuit‘s rule, most Facebook 
communications are unlikely to be protected by the Wiretap 
Act because most aspects of Facebook are designed to be a 
storage site for communications, and not a conduit for 
simultaneous conversations. For example, when A posts a 
message on B‘s Facebook wall, B does not need to be logged on 
to receive it. Moreover, the message remains there indefinitely 
until B actively removes it. 
There is currently one aspect of Facebook‘s communication 
tools, however, that could be fairly interpreted to fit under the 
Wiretap Act. Most notably, the chat function on Facebook 
functions like an ―instant messaging‖ service that typically 
functions in real-time, like a telephone or face-to-face 
conversation. Thus, if the government were to set up a cloned 
Facebook account to monitor a conversation as it happens, the 
Wiretap Act would apply. 
However, as a practical matter, the government is unlikely 
to seek such surveillance because investigators could 
circumvent the high procedural hurdles presented by the 
Wiretap Act by simply waiting long enough to avoid the 
contemporaneity requirement and then retrieving the same 
information. After all, unlike telephone calls, telegrams, faxes, 
and letters, the content of Facebook communications remains 
on a third party server even long after they have been received 
by the intended recipients. Chat messages remain archived in 
the same way as any other e-mail messages. 
Presently, Facebook‘s chat function does not allow video or 
webcam conversations that are currently available through 
instant message services provided by Skype, Google, Yahoo! 
Messenger, or Apple‘s iPhone. Were this predictably to become 
a new Facebook feature, the analysis here would not change 
unless Facebook did not record, archive, or otherwise capture 
the video transmissions and guaranteed this in its privacy 
 
244. Id. at 79. 
245. In re Pharmatrak, Inc. Privacy Litig., 329 F.3d 9, 21 (1st Cir. 2003). 
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policies.246 
Despite the clear need to update the statute, the only 
current efforts to revise this statute involve proposed 
legislation that would require all communications services 
―including encrypted e-mail transmitters like BlackBerry, 
social networking Web sites like Facebook and software that 
allows direct ‗peer to peer‘ messaging like Skype‖ to ensure 
that they will be ready to comply with a government wiretap 
order.247 
 
B. The Stored Communications Act 
 
Whereas the Wiretap Act covers transmission, 
communications in storage are protected by the Stored Wire 
and Electronic Communications and Transactional Records 
Access Act (―Stored Communications Act‖ or ―SCA‖), which is 
Title II of the ECPA.248 ―The SCA was enacted because the 
advent of the Internet presented a host of potential privacy 
breaches that the Fourth Amendment does not address.‖249 
Modeled after the Right to Financial Privacy Act,250 the 
 
246. Given the incredible strain on its servers, most video chat services 
probably do not record live video conversations. But this is more likely a 
technological limitation and not a privacy accommodation. Indeed, the 
privacy policies by these web cam services do not clearly exclude the video 
content from monitored content and, in fact, write their privacy policies to 
potentially encompass such content. See, e.g., Skype Privacy Policy, SKYPE, 
http://www.skype.com/intl/en-us/legal/privacy/general/ (last visited Nov. 11, 
2010). 
247. Charlie Savage, U.S. Tries to Make It Easier to Wiretap the Internet, 
N. Y. TIMES, Sept. 27, 2010, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/09/27/us/27wiretap.html?_r=1&emc=na. 
248. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2701-2712 (2006). Like 2Pac, the SCA has assumed 
many different names. See Orin Kerr, A User‟s Guide to the Stored 
Communications Act, and a Legislator‟s Guide to Amending It, 72 GEO. WASH. 
L. REV. 1208, 1208 n.1 (2004). I agree with Kerr that it is ―easiest and 
simplest to refer to the statute as simply the Stored Communications Act, or 
‗SCA.‘‖ Id. 
249. Quon v. Arch Wireless Operating Co., Inc., 529 F.3d 892, 900 (9th 
Cir. 2008) (citing Kerr, supra note 248, at 1209-13). 
250. See Seth Rosenbloom, Crying Wolf in the Digital Age: Voluntary 
Disclosure Under the Stored Communications Act, 39 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. 
REV. 529, 551 (2008). The Right to Financial Privacy Act (RFPA) prohibits 
banks from releasing financial records without government process. Id. 
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SCA creates civil liability for one who: 
 
(1) intentionally accesses without authorization a 
facility through which an electronic 
communication service is provided; or 
 
(2) intentionally exceeds an authorization to 
access that facility; and thereby obtains, alters, 
or prevents authorized access to a wire or 
electronic communication while it is in electronic 
storage in such system shall be punished as 
provided in subsection (b) of this section.251 
 
The definition of ―electronic storage‖ in the SCA mirrors the 
definition from the Wiretap Act: 
 
(A) any temporary, intermediate storage of a 
wire or electronic communication incidental to 
the electronic transmission thereof; and 
 
(B) any storage of such communication by an 
electronic communications service for purposes of 
backup protection of such communication.252 
 
In essence, the SCA forbids government access to stored 
contents on third party servers. 
However, the SCA also lists a number of exceptions to the 
disclosure ban, including disclosures to a law enforcement 
agency under certain circumstances.253 Section 2702(b) 
announces a number of exceptions to the general rule of 
 
However, the RFPA allows for voluntary disclosures when a bank possesses 
information relevant to a possible violation of a statute or regulation. Id. This 
information ―may include only the name or other identifying information 
concerning any individual, corporation, or account involved in and the nature 
of any suspected illegal activity.‖ See id. (quoting 12 U.S.C. 3403(c) (2000)). 
250. S. Rep. No. 99-541, at 3 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 
3555, 3557. 
251. 18 U.S.C. § 2701(a) (2000). 
252. Id. § 2510 (17). 
253. Id. §§ 2702(b)-(d), 2703. 
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nondisclosure.254 Most notably, 2702(b) allows service providers 
to disclose the contents of electronic communications: 
 
(7) to a law enforcement agency— 
 
(A) if the contents— 
 
(i) were inadvertently obtained by the 
service provider; and 
 
(ii) appear to pertain to the commission of 
a crime; or 
 
(B) [Deleted] 
 
(8) to a governmental entity, if the provider, in 
good faith, believes that an emergency involving 
danger of death or serious physical injury to any 
person requires disclosure without delay of 
communications relating to the emergency. 
 
More importantly, section 2702 also provides an exception for 
disclosures pursuant to a court order under the procedures of 
18 U.S.C. §§ 2516 and 2703.255 
Section 2703 delineates the procedural requirements that 
the government must meet before it can access various 
electronic communications.256 This section provides the 
greatest protection to the content of communications in 
―electronic storage‖ for 180 days or less; this data can only be 
disclosed through a search warrant supported by probable 
 
254. Id. § 2702(b). 
255. S. Rep. No. 99-541, at 37–38 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 
3555, 3581–82. 18 U.S.C. § 2516 lists the procedures for authorizing an 
interception of wire, oral, or electronic communications. 18 U.S.C. § 2703 lists 
the rules the government must meet before accessing electronic 
communications in storage and transactional records related to these 
communications. 
256. 18 U.S.C. § 2703 (2000). 
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cause. 257 However, for communications stored for more than 
180 days, the government can compel disclosure by obtaining a 
search warrant, by combining ―an administrative subpoena 
authorized by a Federal or State statute or a Federal or State 
grand jury or trial subpoena‖ with prior notice to the subscriber 
or customer, or by combining prior notice to the subscriber or 
customer with a court order authorized by 18 U.S.C. § 
2703(d).258 
A section 2703(d) order seems to be the love child of a 
subpoena and search warrant, although it has inherited more 
of the subpoena‘s traits. Under § 2703(d), the government must 
offer ―specific and articulable facts showing that there are 
reasonable grounds to believe that the contents of a wire or 
electronic communication, or the records or other information 
sought, are relevant and material to an ongoing criminal 
investigation.‖259 This ―reasonable suspicion‖ standard is lower 
than the ―probable cause‖ requirement of both the Fourth 
Amendment and the Wiretap Act.260 
Thus, at the end of this statutory treasure hunt, § 2703(d) 
of the SCA allows the government to compel Facebook to 
disclose all content specific to named individuals with a 
subpoena, without probable cause, and without any meaningful 
notice. While Congress arguably intended the SCA to avoid this 
exact scenario,261 a faithful textual reading of the statute places 
Facebook users (and all other Netizens who ―store‖ content on 
ISPs) on the wrong end of the plank. 
For Facebook users expecting privacy, the SCA is also 
woefully inadequate in that it seems to not protect, at all, a 
large category of content that one receives and shares on 
Facebook. The vague definitions of ―electronic storage‖ under § 
2510(17) and § 2511 leave unclear whether the SCA will 
protect previously-read communications less than 180 days old 
 
257. Id. § 2703(a). 
258. Kerr, supra note 248, at 1219 (referring to a court order authorized 
by 18 U.S.C. § 2703(d) as a ―Section 2703(d) order‖). 
259. 18 U.S.C. § 2703(b) (2000). 
260. Id. § 2703(b). 
261. See also Kerr, supra note 248, at 1219 (referring to a court order 
authorized by 18 U.S.C. § 2703(d) as a ―Section 2703(d) order‖). 
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stored on an ISP.262 This is especially alarming since most 
Facebook content less than 180 days old will fall into this 
category. First, all Facebook content is stored on a third-party 
ISP.263 Second, once a Facebook user logs in, any content on the 
user‘s ―home page‖—i.e., her friend ―feed‖—may be considered 
―read,‖ even though the user may not have clicked anything to 
affirmatively read the message and may not have noticed the 
communication. Third, content on Facebook does not disappear 
unless the user actively deletes it, which, unlike e-mail, is not a 
standard practice.264 
Indeed, at least three courts that faced this issue 
interpreted § 2510‘s definition of ―electronic storage‖ narrowly 
and refused to extend the SCA‘s strongest protections to 
previously opened electronic communications.265 However, 
three other courts have interpreted § 2510‘s definition of 
―electronic storage‖ broadly and extended the SCA‘s strongest 
protections to e-mails that have been opened and read by the 
message‘s intended recipient.266 
 
262. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510, 2711 (2002 & 2009). 
263. Facebook does not function like a POP e-mail account where one 
―downloads‖ content and thereby removes it from a server. While Facebook 
may send messages or notifications to an inbox that is downloaded to one‘s 
hard drive or send a ―push‖ notification to one‘s smartphone, no content is 
ever removed from Facebook as a result of this process. 
264. Indeed, those who notice that a Facebook user has deleted a photo, 
message, link, or connection may assume that the user was trying to hide 
something. 
265. See Fraser v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 135 F. Supp. 2d 623 (E.D. 
Pa. 2001), aff‟d in part, vacated in part, and remanded by Fraser v. 
Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 352 F.3d 107 (3d Cir. 2003) (holding that received 
e-mails are not protected by the SCA); United States v. Weaver, No. 09-
30036, 2009 WL 2163478 (C.D. Ill. July 15, 2009) (holding that e-mail 
messages on the web-based Hotmail e-mail program are only subject to the 
SCA‘s weaker privacy protections); Flagg v. City of Detroit, 252 F.R.D. 346 
(E.D. Mich. 2008) (holding that read messages retained by the service 
provider are subject to the SCA‘s weaker protections for remote computing 
services). 
266. See Theofel v. Farey-Jones, 359 F.3d 1066, 1075-76 (9th Cir. 2004) 
(holding that § 2510(17)(B) protects messages remaining on an ISP‘s server 
even after those messages have been delivered to and read by the intended 
recipient); In re Subpoena Duces Tecum to AOL, 550 F. Supp. 2d 606, 614 
(E.D. Va. 2008) (holding that the SCA protects non-party witnesses‘ stored e-
mails on AOL). 
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In Crispin v. Christian Audigier, Inc.,267 a district court 
judge quashed subpoenas served on Facebook in a copyright 
infringement lawsuit that sought private messages sent 
through the site.268 The court held that such messages were 
protected information under the SCA because the user 
employed private settings on Facebook, thereby removing them 
from the category of public communications.269 However, the 
court only addressed one aspect of restricted communications 
on Facebook—the private messaging that functions like an e-
mail service. 
Thus, under the SCA, the only Facebook content that the 
government must clearly have probable cause to obtain is 
―unopened‖ communications sent within the last 180 days. 
That is it. 
Worst of all, the SCA expressly leaves out exclusion as a 
remedy when the government obtains content in violation of 
the statute. Section 2708 states that damages ―are the only 
judicial remedies and sanctions for nonconstitutional violations 
of this chapter.‖270 Thus, even if the government obtained 
information in violation of the SCA, the statute does not 
prevent its inclusion as evidence in a criminal proceeding.271 
Even if a defendant could successfully challenge the 
constitutionality of the compelled disclosure rules of § 2703‘s 
procedures, federal precedents strongly suggest that 
suppression would not be a proper remedy so long as the 
evidence was obtained in objectively reasonable reliance on the 
statute. For example, in Illinois v. Krull,272 the Supreme Court 
 
267. 717 F. Supp. 2d 965 (C.D. Cal. 2010). 
268. Id. at 991. 
269. Id. 
270. 18 U.S.C. § 2708 (1986). 
271. See United States v. Perrine, 518 F.3d 1196, 1202 (10th Cir. 2008) 
(―violations of the ECPA do not warrant exclusion of evidence‖); United 
States v. Steiger, 318 F.3d 1039, 1049 (11th Cir. 2003); United States v. 
Smith, 155 F.3d 1051, 1056 (9th Cir. 1998); United States v. Ferguson, 508 F. 
Supp. 2d 7, 10 (D.D.C. 2007); United States v. Sherr, 400 F. Supp. 2d 843, 
848 (D. Md. 2005); United States v. Kennedy, 81 F. Supp. 2d 1103, 1110 (D. 
Kan. 2000); United States v. Hambrick, 55 F. Supp. 2d 504, 507 (W.D. Va. 
1999), aff‟d, 225 F.3d 656 (4th Cir. 2000); United States v. Reyes, 922 F. 
Supp. 818, 837-38 (S.D.N.Y. 1996). 
272. 480 U.S. 340 (1987) 
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considered the admissibility of evidence obtained pursuant to 
an unconstitutional state vehicle code.273 The Court held that 
the exclusionary rule should not suppress evidence ―obtained 
by an officer acting in objectively reasonable reliance on a 
statute.‖274 While the Court left open the possibility that 
exclusion would be appropriate for a ―clearly unconstitutional‖ 
statute,275 there is no reason to think that § 2703 fits into that 
category. The only federal decision that held § 2703‘s 
procedures unconstitutional was later reversed on appeal.276 
The possibilities to circumvent the SCA‘s restrictions are 
numerous. The SCA is limited to the government and, thus, 
does not prevent Facebook or Internet service providers, in any 
way, from accessing stored data.277 Moreover, if private parties 
were to seek access to Facebook content through civil discovery, 
the SCA is unclear on whether exceptions are made for 
disclosure requests pursuant to a civil discovery subpoena.278 
Thus, if non-government authorities were to access Facebook 
communications, there would be nothing stopping those private 
agents from handing over any information to government 
investigators. 
Finally, in the context of analyzing Facebook users‘ rights 
under the SCA, perhaps the most important statutory 
interpretation is not one from any court, but rather from 
Facebook‘s own practices. As mentioned above in the discussion 
of the Justice Department‘s memorandum obtained by the 
EFF, Facebook makes ―other data available‖ and is 
―cooperative with emergency requests,‖279 while ―MySpace 
requires a search warrant for private messages/bulletins less 
than 181 days old‖ and ―considers friend lists to be stored 
 
273. See id. at 343-44. 
274. Id. at 349. 
275. Id. 
276. See Warshak v. United States, 532 F.3d 521 (6th Cir. 2008) (en 
banc). 
277. See 18 U.S.C. § 2703(c)(1) (2009). 
278. At least one federal court held that civil discovery subpoenas do not 
fit within the statute‘s recognized exceptions allowing for the disclosure of 
electronic communication. See In re DoubleClick, Inc., 154 F. Supp. 2d 497, 
512 (S.D.N.Y. 2001). 
279. John Lynch & Jenny Ellickson, supra note 80, at 17. 
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content.‖280 
While the document does not state that Facebook‘s policy 
is different from MySpace‘s procedures, Facebook has informed 
attorneys with subpoenas in civil cases that ―if the requesting 
party is a governmental agency, a search warrant is required 
for private inbox and/or outbox communication 180 days old or 
less. See 18 U.S.C. § 2703(a).‖281 
Assuming that remains Facebook‘s policy, this is clear 
evidence that Facebook does not require warrants for any 
content more than 180 days old and only requires it for private 
messages. 
 
C. The Pen Register Act 
 
The Pen Register Act282 (PRA) authorizes the government 
to seek a court order authorizing a (1) ―pen register,‖ which 
records outgoing address information283 or (2) a ―trap and trace 
device,‖ which records incoming address information.284 The 
constitutionality of the statute stems from Smith v. Maryland, 
which was discussed above. However, the statute provides a 
smidge more protection than that offered by the Fourth 
Amendment. 
To obtain either a pen register, a trap and trace device, or 
both, the government must certify that ―the information likely 
 
280. Id. at 22. 
281. Sam Glover, Subpoena Facebook Information, LAWYERIST, (July 10, 
2009), http://lawyerist.com/subpoena-facebook-information/. 
282. 18 U.S.C. §§ 3121-3127 (2010). Others have referred to this portion 
of the statute as the Pen/Trap Statute. I will not be using that term, however, 
so as not to create confusion between other laws regulating snares used to 
catch writing instruments. 
283. The PRA defines a ―pen register‖ as ―a device or process which 
records or decodes dialing, routing, addressing, or signaling information 
transmitted by an instrument or facility from which a wire or electronic 
communication is transmitted, provided, however, that such information 
shall not include the contents of any communication.‖ Id. § 3127(3). 
284. The PRA defines a ―trap and trade device‖ as ―a device or process 
which captures the incoming electronic or other impulses which identify the 
originating number or other dialing, routing, addressing, and signaling 
information reasonably likely to identify the source of a wire or electronic 
communication, provided, however, that such information shall not include 
the contents of any communication.‖ Id. § 3127(4). 
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to be obtained is relevant to an ongoing criminal 
investigation.‖285 The standard suggests something far lower 
than probable cause and, perhaps, even lower than reasonable 
suspicion, since the government need not even state any 
specific facts to obtain the order. Moreover, the PRA does not 
require the government to either report back what they 
intercepted or notify the surveillance targets that they were 
monitored. 
The PRA applies to computer network communications.286 
With regard to Internet communications, because most 
Internet headers contain both the ―to‖ and ―from‖ information, 
a device that reads such headers is often referred to as a 
―pen/trap device.‖ 
If a pen/trap is served on an Internet service provider, the 
information recovered pursuant to the PRA must be limited to 
non-content information such as a user‘s ―dialing, routing, 
addressing, [and/or] signaling information‖ and e-mail account. 
Thus, the PRA likely permits the government to obtain: 
 
- All e-mail header information, including the 
address recipients, the time sent or received, and 
the size of the e-mail—but not the subject line 
 
- The IP addresses involved 
 
- The communications ports and protocols 
involved287 
 
One unanswered question is whether these pen/traps allow 
the government to obtain the URLs of every website visited. On 
the one hand, a web address is analogous to a mailing address 
or a telephone number, both of which are not traditionally 
 
285. Id. § 3122(b)(2). 
286. In re Application of United States, 416 F. Supp. 2d 13, 16 (D.D.C. 
2006). 
287. Unfortunately, my understanding of the technology behind 
communications ports and protocols is about as limited as my vocabulary in 
Aramaic. However, after putting in inquires with all of my computer science 
friends, both of them replied that this information would reveal what 
applications were used to send the communications. 
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protected under the Fourth Amendment. Moreover, learning 
that a person visited http://neuticles.com does not reveal any 
more information than learning that a person called 888-638-
8425, which is the toll-free line for ordering canine testicular 
implants from the Neuticles company. On the other hand, 
addresses like http://inmatesforyou.com or 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_ancient_Jedi suggest far 
more content than would be obtained by phone numbers. 
This question of the admissibility of URL addresses is 
especially important in the context of Facebook. After all, if a 
Pen/Trap revealed that a Facebook user visited 
http://www.facebook.com/pages/When-someone-says-stop-my-
brain-says-Hammertime/203249412335, the information 
revealed goes far beyond the traffic analysis originally 
envisioned by the statute. Because of the way that URLs on 
Facebook are named, the police would not only learn IP 
addresses and sizes of communications, but also an intimate 
secret that the investigated individual may possess—that when 
he hears, ―Stop!‖, his brain often says, ―Hammertime!‖ 
Another unanswered question of law is what happens 
when the government cannot use a pen/trap device without 
collecting impermissible content. There are at least two district 
court decisions suggesting that these devices cannot be used if 
it collects content.288 Finally, a related emerging issue is 
whether the PRA authorizes the collection of ―post-cut-through 
dialed digits,‖ which is a questionably-worded term to describe 
those numbers dialed after an initial call is complete.289 
 
288. See In re Application of the United States, 622 F. Supp. 2d 411, 422 
(S.D. Tex. 2007) (―[T]he Pen Register Statute does not permit the 
Government simply to minimize the effects of its collection of unauthorized 
content, but instead prohibits the collection of content in the first place.‖); In 
re Application of United States, 416 F. Supp. 2d at 17 (―[T]he Government 
must ensure that the process or device used to obtain information about e-
mail communications excludes the contents of those communications.‖). 
289. The few courts that faced this issue held that the pen/trap devices 
cannot be used if they collect these post-cut-through dialed digits. See In re 
Applications of United States, 515 F. Supp. 2d 325, 339 (E.D.N.Y. 2007); In re 
Application of United States, 622 F. Supp. 2d. at 422; In re Application of 
United States, 441 F. Supp. 2d 816, 827 (S.D. Tex. 2006). While post-cut-
through dialed digits do not literally pertain to the Internet or Facebook, I 
mention it here for two reasons. First, whatever rules ultimately emerge will 
affect what happens when a pen/trap device collects similarly extraneous 
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D. Summary of Facebook Privacy Rights under the ECPA 
 
Under the ECPA, as interpreted by the courts, the Justice 
Department, and Facebook, the only Facebook content clearly 
protected by the statute are ―unopened‖ e-mails sent within the 
last 180 days, which requires the government have probable 
cause to obtain. There is an active dispute over whether 
―opened‖ e-mails sent within the last 180 days are also 
similarly protected. Nothing else clearly requires a warrant. 
Beyond private Facebook messages less than 181 days old, 
all other content can be disclosed with a mere subpoena and no 
notice. Moreover, the subpoena may not even be required for 
content that is arguably outside the scope of the ECPA like 
friend lists, which are not clearly ―communications‖ that are 
stored or ―content‖ in transit. Finally, if the government 
compels disclosure without fully meeting the subpoena or 
warrant requirements, the ECPA provides no suppression 
remedy to exclude the improperly-obtained evidence from being 
used against a criminal defendant. 
Even if the ECPA is interpreted to protect more Facebook 
content and apply the warrant requirement to that content, 
Facebook is still not prevented from voluntarily disclosing its 
users‘ content to the government. Its privacy policies are too 
vague to provide users with an argument that disclosures of 
criminal activity violated the terms of the agreement. 
 
VI. Facebook as the Twenty-First Century Phone Booth: A 
Proposal to Redefine Reasonable Expectations and Revise the 
ECPA 
 
One of the many flaws in federal privacy laws can be most 
easily summarized by considering the following two facts: 
 
 
content information from a Facebook user. Second, I strongly suspect that the 
framers of the Fourth Amendment clearly intended to protect the government 
from obtaining the identities of the specific dancers that my wife and I vote 
for, using a touch-tone phone, on the reality dance competition show, So You 
Think You Can Dance. However, as of yet, neither I nor the editors of the 
Pace Law Review have been able to obtain any support for this assertion. 
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1. All Facebook users lack a reasonable 
expectation of privacy if Facebook openly admits 
that it monitors its users‘ content and activity. 
 
2. Facebook polices its site and users for sex 
offenders and other related suspicious activity. 
 
I am relieved and grateful that Facebook is proactively making 
Facebook a safer space for minors. But Facebook cannot engage 
in such protections without also trampling upon my privacy 
rights. The only reason that privacy and a predator-free 
Facebook are mutually exclusive, however, is because of 
judicial opinions written before online social networking sites 
surfaced. 
First and foremost, I submit that Katz should be 
interpreted in ways more focused on the Court‘s concern about 
the parameters of government surveillance and less focused on 
whether an individual expects privacy from non-government 
entities.290 The Court suppressed the content of Katz‘s phone 
conversation even though he stood in ―public,‖ in full view of 
others, and knowingly divulged the ―content‖ of his message to 
another citizen, as well as all the operators that had the 
capability to listen in.291 That the person to whom he was 
speaking or the eavesdropping operators could have divulged 
the content of the call to others did not affect the outcome. 
There is at least one meaningful difference between Katz‘s 
1967 conversation in the phone booth and the equivalent one 
 
290. See, e.g., Andrew E. Taslitz, The Fourth Amendment in the Twenty-
First Century: Technology, Privacy, and Human Emotions, 65 LAW & 
CONTEMP. PROBS. 125 (2002). My thoughts were influenced by an article 
written before Katz by Anthony Amsterdam, who asked whether the Fourth 
Amendment should ―be viewed as a collection of protections of atomistic 
spheres of interest of individual citizens or as a regulation of governmental 
conduct[?] Does it safeguard my person and your house and her papers and 
his effects against unreasonable searches and seizures; or is it essentially a 
regulatory canon requiring government to order its law enforcement 
procedures in a fashion that keeps us collectively secure in our persons, 
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures?‖ 
Anthony G. Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment, 58 MINN. L. 
REV. 349, 367 (1974) (emphasis in original). 
291. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967). 
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he might have on Facebook today. Today, Katz would be having 
more of a ―party line‖ conversation on Facebook, whereas he 
was presumably only talking to one individual in 1967. While 
this might suggest that a Facebook user who broadcasts his 
status to his one thousand friends is less likely to have a 
reasonable expectation of privacy, the Court never suggested 
that additional message recipients instantly defeat the 
expectation. There is no language in the opinion to suggest that 
had the bookie, whom Katz called, asked a colleague to pick up 
another telephone in the house to form a three-way 
conversation, the outcome would have changed. 
As the Court in Katz stressed, the question of what ―may 
be constitutionally protected‖ depends on what a person ―seeks 
to preserve as private.‖292 Thus, the fact that Katz was 
standing in a glass Los Angeles telephone booth, as opposed to 
his private home, did not defeat his right to be free from 
government surveillance. His act of ―shut[ting] the door behind 
him‖ was the action he took to indicate that he did not intend 
to ―broadcast to the world.‖293 The fact that the person whom 
Katz was calling could have broadcast the content to the world 
did not even warrant mention in the majority opinion. 
Courts should view Facebook as the twenty-first century 
equivalent of a phone booth. Just as the ―question is not 
whether the telephone booth is a constitutionally protected 
area,‖294 the question should not be whether Facebook is or is 
not a constitutionally protected area. Today, if Katz‘s son sets 
his Facebook content to ―private‖ and limits his conversations 
to trusted friends, he has done the equivalent of shutting the 
phone booth doors. As discussed above, he cannot possibly 
expect that his content will be kept out of the government‘s 
hands—whether because of friends sharing the information, 
Facebook forwarding the information, or because the 
government could obtain a warrant—just as Katz could not 
assume that the person he called would not divulge the content 
of the conversation to the police. 
However, he can reasonably assume that he is not 
 
292. Id. at 351. 
293. Id. at 352. 
294. Id. at 349. 
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undergoing government surveillance despite the fact that: (1) a 
Facebook employee can ―listen‖ to the conversation (just as a 
telephone operator could do the same); (2) he has no way of 
knowing who, exactly, is on the ―other line‖; and (3) he knows 
that his content might be seen beyond the intended 
distribution list (just as Katz‘s bookie could have invited 
government agents to come over and listen in on the call). 
Conversely, a Facebook user who keeps his setting ―public‖ 
has left the phone booth door open and sacrificed his privacy 
protections, even if communicating from home. That user 
knows that what ―he utters into the mouthpiece‖ will ―be 
broadcast to the world.‖295 Moreover, the information that is 
always public on Facebook—one‘s profile photo, for example—is 
equivalent to one‘s physical appearance or clothes while 
standing in a glass phone booth. There can be no expectation of 
privacy there since a government investigator could snap a 
photo at any moment. Finally, the IP address is an example of 
non-content information on par with a telephone number. 
The shift toward interpreting Katz as an opinion about 
limiting government surveillance—and less about individual 
rights—may not be of much import in most criminal procedure 
contexts. Such a shift would not affect whether local police 
should be able to enter individual homes to search through 
one‘s hope chest or dream journal. But that shift would allow 
social networking sites to allow users to communicate without 
giving up their rights against unwarranted government 
surveillance. After all, if the Fourth Amendment solely protects 
the ―atomistic spheres of interest‖ of an individual, then 
privacy no longer exists when two individuals connect through 
Facebook.296 
This shift would also effectively redefine the Third Party 
Doctrine to focus on whether a third party who works for the 
government has access, not on whether any third party has 
access. This shift is necessary since in today‘s digital age, other 
companies such as Internet service providers and Facebook, 
will be able to access both content and non-content information. 
Even if Facebook has a license to distribute its users‘ 
 
295. Id. at 352. 
296. Amsterdam, supra note 290, at 367. 
80http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol31/iss1/7
2011] FROM FACEBOOK TO MUG SHOT 371 
intellectual property, it does not own the information. Facebook 
is merely a steward of this information. Thus, there is nothing 
inherent to joining Facebook that should be seen as sacrificing 
all privacy interests. 
In that context, I find the Court‘s decision in Miller 
addressing bank records to be instructive. In the same way 
that a bank customer might consent to a bank employee 
viewing her ―private papers,‖ a Facebook user effectively 
consents to Facebook employees viewing her ―private‖ content. 
Just as the bank does not own or possess the private papers, 
Facebook does not own or possess the user‘s content. Thus, 
applying Miller, courts should be able to separate out the 
―private papers‖ from the ―business records‖ on Facebook. 
Similarly, if the Fourth Amendment was intended to be a 
regulation of governmental conduct to preserve society‘s 
privacy interests, as I believe, then private communications 
through a third party social networking site should be just as 
protected as private communications through the postal 
service. Just as the sender of a first class letter has a privacy 
expectation in the content inside the envelope, but not the 
information outside the envelope, a Facebook user should have 
an expectation of privacy in the content of her correspondence, 
but not the routing information for the data. 
Thus, when considering the constitutionality of 
government searches on social networking sites, a court‘s focus 
should not be on the user‘s individual expectation of privacy, 
but rather, the individual‘s expectation of privacy from 
government surveillance. Any other result would lead to a 
perverted outcome where increasingly archaic communication 
tools have advanced privacy protections and modern 
communication tools will lack them. 
Nothing inherent to the architecture of the Internet 
necessitates such a drop in privacy protections. Undoubtedly, 
in the age of high-definition video cameras that fit into one‘s 
pocket, citizens in wired societies understand how much more 
detailed information can travel much more quickly to many 
more people. But this reality does not translate to the 
inevitability of constant surveillance. In fact, with electronic 
data, a company with resources like Facebook could encrypt 
data and make privacy expectations higher than any other 
81
372 PACE LAW REVIEW [Vol.  31:1 
form of communication. 
If anything, the government‘s access to advanced 
technological surveillance tools like KeyLogger, which uses 
hardware or software to covertly track the keys struck on a 
computer keyboard so that the government can collect 
passwords,297 should be accompanied by similar privacy 
―upgrades.‖ Otherwise, modern technology will always shift the 
balance towards government surveillance and away from 
citizen privacy. 
Of course, even if the Supreme Court adopts a ―reasonable 
expectation of privacy from government surveillance‖ rule, it 
may not protect users of social networking sites when 
warrantless government searches become more widespread and 
publicized.298 Indeed, one high-profile arrest may be enough to 
destroy the nation‘s expectation. If Facebook openly and 
willingly passes pop singer Justin Bieber‘s incriminating 
photos to government investigators who subsequently arrest 
him for a non-life-threatening crime, the ensuing publicity 
itself could diminish the nation‘s privacy rights.299 
Of course, even if Facebook gleefully provided government 
investigators carte blanche to view users‘ information, I 
suspect the site would still be active, thanks to its millions of 
users who are law-abiding (and have nothing to hide) or law-
ignoring (and want to highlight their rebellious nature) or too 
curious to cut themselves off from their friends‘ broadcasts. Put 
another way, many users may knowingly sacrifice their privacy 
in exchange for the opportunity to see what their high school 
prom dates look like a decade later. 
But without both governmental and Facebook privacy 
protections in place, I suspect millions of users will close their 
 
297. See Declan McCullagh, Feds Use Keylogger to Thwart PGP, 
Hushmail, CNET NEWS, (July 10, 2007, 4:45 AM), http://news.cnet.com/8301-
10784_3-9741357-7.html. 
298. Or when this Article makes its way to the nightstand of every 
American, which may or may not be inevitable. 
299. The incident could easily shatter expectations of privacy from 
government surveillance, prompt users to diminish or altogether cease 
Facebook activity, and require Facebook executives to hire security to protect 
themselves from angry Beiberbots, Beliebers, and others infected with Bieber 
Fever. 
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accounts or stifle their activity upon realizing that their lives 
may be under government surveillance. After all, even though 
Facebook users can choose what to share and to whom it will be 
disclosed, they cannot control what incriminating information 
will be revealed by their friends or soon-to-be unfriended 
frenemies. Thus, their best option is to leave Facebook 
altogether and hope that their absence will prompt their 
friends to leave as well. 
While the stifling of Facebook activity may be 
inconsequential, the need for a statutory revision is 
paramount. At stake is nothing less than the potential for the 
Internet to be a utopian marketplace of ideas and a global 
community that connects people in an otherwise-isolated 
digital world. 
As for statutory revisions, I propose the SCA be amended 
to require that any compelled disclosure of electronic 
information, including content on Facebook, require full 
warrant protection. This would require the government to 
demonstrate probable cause to a neutral magistrate. If, 
however, the government will still be allowed to conduct such 
searches with an administrative subpoena, the ECPA should 
require that subpoenas provide meaningful notice to the user to 
bring the privacy laws closer to the warrantless searches 
allowed in other contexts. To close these gaping holes in the 
current privacy laws, Congress must implement several 
changes. 
First, the Stored Communications Act needs to be revised 
to make clear that all forms of content that a person uploads to 
or disseminates through Facebook are covered. Given that 
Facebook reveals ―content‖ that may not neatly fit into the 
definition of ―electronic communications,‖ the statute should 
leave no doubt that all activity on Facebook—including wall 
postings, photo-sharing, or event-creating—will be protected. 
Moreover, in light of all the data that Facebook users provide 
when joining the site, the specific subscriber information or 
―non-content‖ that can be disclosed without any judicial 
oversight should also be delineated. 
Second, the SCA must be amended to require the 
government to obtain a Section 2703(d) order for all remote 
computing services (in addition to electronic communications 
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services). Thus, regardless of whether Facebook is serving as 
―storage‖ or as a facilitator of messages, judicial supervision 
will be required if any content stored on the site will be 
disclosed to the government. 
Third, the SCA should also impose a court-order provision 
on non-governmental entities that compel production of the 
contents of electronic communications under § 2703.300 Without 
this judicial oversight, the voluntary disclosure doctrine would 
allow private entities to easily compel such production and 
hand it over to the government. Moreover, such an amendment 
would eliminate the conflicting interpretations of the SCA. 
Fourth, the SCA should state that the exclusionary rule 
will apply to evidence obtained in violation of any of these 
statutory provisions, even if the evidence was not obtained 
pursuant to a government search under the Fourth 
Amendment. Without this last component, the SCA, in the 
 
300. See Zwillinger & Genetski, supra note 139, at 597-98. The authors 
propose the following amendment, which I wholeheartedly endorse: 
 
―18 U.S.C. § 2702(c)(4): Court orders by non-governmental 
entities. 
A non-governmental entity who is a party to pending 
criminal or civil litigation may petition the court in which 
such litigation is pending for an order requiring a service 
provider to disclose contents of electronic communications in 
electronic storage or contents of wire or electronic 
communications in a remote computing service and such 
order shall issue only if the requesting party can 
demonstrate that the requested information is relevant and 
material to the ongoing litigation and is unavailable from 
other sources, and both the subscriber or customer whose 
materials are sought and the service provider from whom 
the materials will be produced are provided reasonable 
notice and the opportunity to be heard. In the case of a 
State court, such a court order shall not issue if prohibited 
by the law of such state. A court issuing an order pursuant 
to this section, on a motion made promptly by the service 
provider, may quash or modify such order, if the 
information or records requested are unusually voluminous 
in nature, or compliance with such an order would cause an 
undue burden on such provider. In all cases, the service 
provider shall be entitled to cost reimbursement by the 
requesting party, as set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 2706.‖ 
 
Id. 
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criminal context, will not extend any privacy protections 
beyond what the Fourth Amendment already guarantees. 
Fifth, to ensure that administrative subpoenas do not lead 
to unjustified intrusions of privacy on the Internet, federal law 
should ensure judicial safeguards in the form of a neutral 
magistrate who protects against over breadth and harassment 
and requires an explanation as to why a subpoena is necessary. 
Moreover, if a subpoena will not provide a user with notice and 
the chance to file a motion to quash, federal laws should limit 
the issuance of subpoenas to life-threatening crimes in which 
time is of the essence. 
Sixth, Congress should mandate encryption for those 
government and non-government entities that transmit 
sensitive or private information through the Internet. Since not 
all companies have the resources to do this, the government 
should invest in more advanced encryption technology and 
other cyber-security measures to ensure the highest safety of 
sensitive and private content transmitted through the 
Internet.301 Under the existing Third Party Doctrine, 
encryption would increase users‘ expectation of privacy because 
Facebook employees would not be able to view all user content. 
While law enforcement agencies might argue that this will 
frustrate efforts to crack down on cybercrime (and all other 
crime), such encryption measures will also minimize the crime 
or cyberterrorism that results when others with more nefarious 
motives gain access to such information. 
Lest I be accused of fighting for criminals‘ rights, my 
concern here is more about the chilling effect that comes with 
 
301. According to postings on CNET, one reason websites like Facebook, 
AOL, Yahoo, and Microsoft do not currently offer encryption to their users is 
the slightly slower speed at which servers function when using a secure web 
search and the processor power required to scramble and unscramble the SSL 
connection. See Elinor Mills, Google Rolls Out Encrypted Web Search Option, 
CNET NEWS (May 21, 2010, 12:30 PM), http://news.cnet.com/8301-27080_3-
20005636-245.html?tag=mncol;txt. However, users have increasingly 
demanded encryption options and, in some cases, turned to third party 
encryption websites and ―add-ons‖ offered through web servers such as 
Firefox. See Elinor Mills, Firefox Add-On Encrypts Sessions with Facebook, 
Twitter, CNET NEWS (June 18, 2010, 2:24 PM), http://news.cnet.com/8301-
27080_3-20008217-245.html. While it may be a matter of time before private 
companies invest in this technology themselves, the government is in the best 
position to invest in this public good and speed up the process. 
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secret government surveillance. Much of the ―good‖ that 
Facebook currently provides—political change, romantic 
unions, and safe spaces for like-minded individuals to have an 
outlet for frustrations—would probably be stifled in real space 
if people knew that government cameras were monitoring their 
activity. 
One illustration of this chilling effect pertains to the 
interesting relationship that ―closeted‖ gay and lesbian 
Americans have with Facebook. Imagine a gay man who is 
―out‖ to a small group of trusted friends, but wishes to remain 
―in the closet‖ to everyone else. The minute he joins Facebook, 
he faces a tough choice when asked about his sexual 
orientation: he could lie (and risk being mocked or criticized), 
he could violate Facebook policies and create two accounts,302 or 
he could choose not to reveal his sexual orientation but 
vigilantly police his Facebook page to ensure that friends do 
not unintentionally force awkward conversations with family 
members who think he ―just hasn‘t met the right woman 
yet.‖303 Plus, the more honest he is about other connections and 
interests, the more he risks being outed; two MIT students 
developed a software program called ―Gaydar‖ that predicts 
sexual orientation based on the user‘s interests and circle of 
friends.304 On the other hand, as Queerty blogger Arthur 
Dunlop observed, ―services like Facebook and Twitter are 
actually also fantastic for closeted queers. They are lifelines to 
other people like you, with the same fears and anxiety you‘re 
 
302. Part of Facebook‘s efforts to crack down on this practice include 
recent decisions to shut out users with unusual names. Barbara Ortutay, 
Real Users Caught in Facebook Fake-Name Purge, SFGATE, May 25, 2009, 
http://articles.sfgate.com/2009-05-25/business/20872135_1_accounts-with-
fake-names-facebook-facebook-guidelines-and-features. This became a 
problem when actual users like Robin Kills The Enemy, a Native American 
woman, was shut out of her account. Id. 
303. This explains why Joshua Alston of Newsweek advised a friend: ―if 
you want to be in the closet, you can‘t be on Facebook.‖ Joshua Alston, The 
Digital Closet, NEWSWEEK, June 2, 2010, 
http://www.newsweek.com/2010/06/02/the-digital-closet.html. 
304. See Carolyn Y. Johnson, Project „Gaydar,‟ BOSTON GLOBE, Sept. 20, 
2009, 
http://www.boston.com/bostonglobe/ideas/articles/2009/09/20/project_gaydar_
an_mit_experiment_raises_new_questions_about_online_privacy/. 
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facing living a double life.‖305 Clearly, this is a tough personal 
choice that has motivated some to come out to everyone on 
Facebook306 and led others to stay away from social networking 
altogether. 
But now imagine that this man must make this choice in a 
forum with few limits on government surveillance. Announcing 
that one is gay is not a crime. But it can lead him to be 
discharged from the military under Don‘t Ask, Don‘t Tell. It 
can also cost him the opportunity to adopt a child in states like 
Florida.307 While the risks exist without government 
surveillance, he need not be overly suspicious to conclude that 
he is better off staying away from social networking or living a 
less honest life online. Such a result, I submit, is antithetical to 
the philosophical underpinnings of the First and Fourth 
Amendments. 
I should admit that, as a new parent, I worry about crime 
much more. My son is not old enough to do much more than 
bang on the keyboard, but I still worry about the ways in which 
Facebook and the Internet pose additional dangers to children. 
But even at my most paranoid, I find myself more concerned 
than comforted by unrestrained police surveillance. Perhaps 
this is because on Facebook, unlike other sites that allow 
anonymous postings, the community seems to have developed a 
strong set of self-policing norms that led to many arrests to 
which I have no objections. 
Finally, I should note that if all of my suggestions are 
implemented, courts may still conclude that some or all 
Facebook users lack a ―reasonable‖ expectation of privacy, 
especially given the company‘s current policies. A judge may 
conclude that the very purpose of social networking sites—
which is to share information—requires a presumption against 
 
305. Arthur Dunlop, Is It Impossible to Stay in the Closet If You‟re on 
Facebook and Twitter?, QUEERTY (June 3, 2010), http://www.queerty.com/is-
it-impossible-to-stay-in-the-closet-if-youre-on-facebook-and-twitter-
20100603/#ixzz10kAOyPhU. 
306. Caryn Brooks, How to Come Out on Facebook, TIME, June 2, 2009, 
http://www.time.com/time/nation/article/0,8599,1901909,00.html. 
307. See FLA. STAT. § 63.042(3) (2009) (banning ―homosexuals‖ from 
adopting); Lofton v. Sec‘y of the Dep‘t of Children and Family Servs., 358 
F.3d 804 (11th Cir. 2004) (upholding the law). 
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privacy. I have no objection to this, so long as the conclusion is 
reached by exploring the specific facts, contexts, and policies 
that led the evidence into the government‘s hands. 
My recommendations above are largely intended to 
prevent a judge from using the following checklist while 
overseeing a suppression hearing for non-e-mail content: 
 
- Was the evidence obtained from the Internet? 
 
- If yes, do not suppress. 
 
Until this checklist adopts analogous factors used to judge the 
reasonableness of a user‘s expectation of offline privacy, the 
Internet will be dueling privacy until one or both of them dies. 
 
VII.  Conclusion 
 
I am not a privacy ―nut,‖ despite what this Article might 
suggest. In fact, I have given up most of my own personal 
expectations of privacy since the late 1990s, when I accepted 
that existing in the digital era and enjoying modern technology 
meant living life in a glass house. But the reasons behind my 
privacy surrender were not ones that could be shared by 
everybody. In fact, they were quite specific to me, my age, and 
my Japanese immigrant parents who named me. 
To explain, I must tell you two things about me. First, to 
my knowledge, there is no other Junichi Semitsu in the world. 
While Junichi is a fairly common Japanese name, Semitsu is a 
very unusual name in Japan (and every country that lies north, 
south, east, and west of Japan). 
Second, I was an undergraduate at U.C. Berkeley from 
1991-1996. When I was a freshman, only the computer science 
students had e-mail accounts. But by the time I graduated, 
every student—even ones majoring in Amish Studies308—had 
 
308. So that I do not get accused of defaming my beloved alma mater, I 
should state, for the record, that there was no official major at U.C. Berkeley 
called Amish Studies. However, as Berkeley allowed undergraduates to 
create an Interdisciplinary Field Major that allowed students to customize 
their own areas of study, I cannot affirmatively say that a student did not 
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an e-mail account. We students began exploring, 
communicating, and creating on the new frontier of the 
Internet, unaware of the immortal digital trail left behind. 
Thus, when Yahoo! and Google began indexing the web in 
the late 1990s, a web search for ―Junichi Semitsu‖ resulted in 
only sites related to me. Not one indexed page included the 
words ―Junichi‖ and ―Semitsu‖ for reasons unrelated to me. 
Unlike the John Smiths and Maria Lees of the world, I had no 
way to ―hide‖ on the Internet. 
As a result, any person on the Internet today can still see, 
for example, the entire classified ad I posted on a usenet 
bulletin board in 1995 inquiring whether anybody wanted to 
buy my extra Lollapalooza tickets to see Beck, Hole, and 
Cypress Hill perform.309 At the time, I had no concept that I 
was writing words that would outlive me and, perhaps one day, 
allow my great-grandchildren to discover their great-
grandfather‘s college phone number. 
Thus, I have accepted that I have no privacy on the 
Internet. I could hope that sites documenting my nonsensical 
ramblings or youthful indiscretions will fade when 
overshadowed by sites about other people named Junichi 
Semitsu. But for this plan to succeed, I need to procreate like 
Kate Gosselin and name my kids like George Foreman,310 or 
inspire hundreds to change their name to Junichi Semitsu. 
Given the low probability of either event, my online past will 
always affect my offline future. 
It does not have to be this way for everybody. But the lack 
of SNS privacy protections will eventually push the young John 
Smiths and Maria Lees of the world to join me in acquiescing to 
a life without privacy. 
Warning people about privacy risks on Facebook will have 
the same effect as warning them about the dangers of driving. 
 
develop a concentration devoted to studying the Amish. 
309. See Junichi P. Semitsu, FS: LOLLAPALOOZA Tix – First Tier – 
8/18 – ucb.market.misc, GOOGLE GROUPS, http://bit.ly/a3GkkH (last visited 
November 29, 2010). I am grateful that I was not looking to part with my 
extra New Kids On The Block cassingles. 
310. All five of his sons and two (out of five) of his daughters are named 
George Forman. See Biography for George Forman, IMDB, 
http://www.imdb.com/name/nm0286040/bio (last visited November 29, 2010). 
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Just as some might be incentivized to use public transportation 
more, some might be less inclined to document every aspect of 
their fraternity‘s hazing rituals. But, like cars, social 
networking sites like Facebook are not disappearing anytime 
soon. Thus, like me, they will simply surrender and acquiesce 
to living life in the open. 
Hoping for an SNS with better privacy policies to overtake 
Facebook‘s place in the national zeitgeist is equivalent to 
hoping that crystal meth will motivate an addict to stop using 
heroin. Granted, under basic marketplace theory, Facebook‘s 
troubling privacy practices should prompt users to find another 
site with better policies or, perhaps, to abandon SNS 
altogether. More broadly, the lack of privacy on the Internet 
should motivate users to go offline. But that ignores the reality 
that, in the twenty-first century, life without the Internet is 
hardly a life at all. 
Facebook is not just an important part of people‘s social 
lives. It has become an essential part of our lives. But even if 
another social networking site with better privacy policies 
comes along and steals Facebook‘s traffic, the possibility of 
constant warrantless surveillance by the government will 
remain. 
One thing that Mark Zuckerberg, the Supreme Court, and 
I all agree on is that privacy is a ―social norm‖ that ―has 
evolved over time.‖311 But while Zuckerberg has essentially 
declared that privacy is dead,312 the Supreme Court has not 
concurred and I remain naively hopeful that he is wrong. If 
Zuckerberg is correct, however, that privacy as a social norm is 
dead, the Supreme Court‘s jurisprudence suggests that our 
legal privacy rights will follow it to the grave. 
This explains why my concerns about Facebook privacy are 
much bigger than Facebook. If our privacy rights under the 
Constitution depend on our collective reasonable expectations 
and the Facebook generation comes to accept life without 
privacy, the result will inevitably be a nation without privacy. 
 
311. Bobbie Johnson, Privacy No Longer a Social Norm, Says Facebook 
Founder, GUARDIAN, (Jan. 11, 2010, 1:58 GMT), 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/technology/2010/jan/11/facebook-privacy. 
312. Id. 
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Given my resistance to accept such altered norms and 
refusal to concede that such shifts should alter our collective 
privacy rights, I am tempted to suggest that my interpretation 
of the Fourth Amendment is originalist in nature. 
Undoubtedly, it‘s a ridiculous exercise to ask what the Framers 
of the Bill of Rights might have thought about government 
surveillance through a global social network on a digital and 
optical data communication system viewable through the 
hypertext transfer protocol. (Obviously, James Madison would 
have immediately joined Facebook just to check out pictures of 
George Mason‘s wife.) 
But the question is better framed as such: Would the 
Framers have tolerated the King of England and British 
customs inspectors conducting unjustified investigations of 
American citizens through Facebook, as opposed to warrantless 
searches, if the monarchy‘s level of access was the same? If 
Facebook was a government operation and citizens were 
required to join, the Framers would have pointed their muskets 
at Mark Zuckerberg. 
But would the Framers have accepted similar results 
merely because a private company managed to lull citizens into 
sharing their intimate thoughts while voluntarily passing on 
any incriminating information to the throne? It defies logic to 
suggest they would have lived under the rule of a government 
with the largely unchecked ability to monitor the intimate 
details of private individuals merely because new technology 
makes such surveillance possible. 
In my view, the Fourth Amendment was drafted to create 
a balance between the government‘s need to ensure order and 
the citizen‘s right to live life without unchecked surveillance 
into her private affairs. Facebook has fundamentally tilted that 
balance. 
Death will be knocking on privacy‘s door unless Congress 
and the courts ensure that Americans be granted online 
privacy rights on par with those available offline. Without such 
intervention, privacy may soon be reduced to a Facebook 
memorial page that allows older users to wax nostalgic and 
mourn an idea gone too soon. 
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